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
THE LATE HOSTILITIES

ON THE

NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

49

PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY.



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PAPERS RESPECTING THE LATE HOSTILITIES ON THE NORTH-
WESTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA.

— No. 1. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL of *India* in Council to the SECRET COMMITTEE of
the EAST INDIA COMPANY.—Fort William, July 2, 1845.—(No. 54.)

(Extract.)

We take the earliest opportunity of forwarding to you the copy of a minute by the Governor-general, dated the 16th ultimo, relative to the proposed visit of his Excellency to the Upper Provinces during the ensuing cold season. In the arguments contained in the minute, relative to the high expediency, if not necessity, for the presence of the Governor-general in the neighbourhood of our north-west frontier after the close of the rains, we unanimously and entirely concur.

Enclosure in No. 1.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of *India*.—June 16, 1845.

(Extract.)

As the time has now arrived when preparations will require to be made for the journey of the Governor-general to the Upper Provinces, I consider it most advisable to consult my colleagues before any steps are taken to carry that intention into effect.

Under ordinary circumstances I should have desired, on public grounds, to remain the next winter and summer at Calcutta, in order to have the advantage of the experience and advice of the Council, by which course the usual business of the Government can be transacted with more unity, regularity and general satisfaction than when the Governor-general is separated from his colleagues.

On the other hand, it is clearly my duty to place myself in that position, as regards the exercise of my functions, by which I can most advantageously apply my exertions for the service of the state.

In this, as in every other case, the real question for decision is, whether it is more for the public interests that I should this autumn proceed to the Upper Provinces, or remain at the usual seat of Government.

Between my colleagues and myself there has always existed a most anxious desire, and perfect unison of opinion, that no efforts or precautions should be spared to maintain a Sikh Government in the Punjab as long as it may be possible.

To carry the pacific policy of the Government of India into effect, we have been content to suffer great inconvenience, considerable expense, and some risk, necessarily caused by the presence of a large disorganised Sikh force on the frontier, requiring, on our part, an army to be assembled for the protection of our frontier, and in close contact with that of the Sikhs; I need not enter into the consideration of the various questions of solicitude which are involved, in the proximity of a Sikh army, in a successful state of mutiny, so close upon our frontier.

We have never relinquished the hope that some amelioration may eventually take place, affording the prospect of the re-establishment of a Sikh Government, able to carry on its ordinary functions. We have never abandoned the expectation that, after anarchy and military violence have long prevailed, these disorders, having reached their maturity, might subside, worn out, and exhausted by their own virulence; or that some man of superior capacity and master mind might appear amongst them, able to control this mutinous army, and to re-construct a strong Sikh Government.

I must confess that these hopes have not been strengthened by recent events ; and now that we can, at this season, when all military operations are nearly suspended, deliberately review the political and military condition of the Punjab, I can arrive at no other conclusion than that the state of our relations with that country has become more critical than it has been at any time since Rajah Heera Sing's death.

When the finances of the state shall be found to be insufficient to pay the troops, a state of things may arise at any moment requiring the instant decision of the highest authority on the spot.

The instructions which we may send from Calcutta may be very proper, and applicable to the state of things which may have happened on the frontier ten days before, when the report was made ; and may, when the instructions are received, twenty days after the event, be totally inapplicable.

In ordinary transactions this is an inconvenience, but in the state of the Punjab it is positively dangerous.

I have a firm conviction that the chances of preserving peace will be diminished by the powerless state in which the Government would be placed, by not being able to act with decision and promptitude, and that opportunities would be lost of effecting some good, and of preventing much mischief, if in the state of the Punjab the responsible authority of the Government remains more than 1,000 miles off, at the other extremity of Bengal ; it appears to me, therefore, to be expedient, as a means of averting risk, and of carrying our policy more securely into effect, that the Governor-general should, in the month of October next, proceed to the Upper Provinces, and that the authority should be entrusted to him with which the law enables the Council to invest him, when separated from his colleagues.

Having given my decided opinion that, under existing circumstances, it will be the duty of the Governor-general to proceed to the Upper Provinces in the autumn, I have to request the attention of my colleagues to this subject, at their earliest convenience.

H. Hardinge.

I concur, *T. H. Maddock.*

I concur *F. Millett.*

I concur, *Geo. Pollock.*

As the separation of the Governor-general from the Council requires the sanction of a law, I presume it is proper that I should record my opinion upon the proposition.

I concur, *C. H. Cameron.*

— No. 2. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL in Council to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Fort William, August 7, 1845.—(No. 63.)

(Extract.)

In the midst of anarchy, conspiracies for the destruction of conflicting parties, treachery, and debauchery, there is an attempt making at improvement, in the suppression of open rebellion, and in maintaining the peace of the capital, which has not been altogether without success, and the collection of the revenue has been somewhat improved, under the management, able, though corrupt, of Dewan Deena Nath.

Military preparation is also being made with more than usual vigour ; but, notwithstanding this, we can perceive nothing to lead to the expectation of a permanent and strong Government being formed.

— No. 3. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL in Council to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Fort William,
September 6, 1845.—(No. 70.)

(Extract.)

WE would request attention to extracts from letters addressed on different dates, during the last month, by Major Broadfoot, to our Secretary.

These extracts, illustrating the present deplorably profligate condition of the Lahore Durbar, cannot fail to impress upon you the almost hopeless expectation of any immediate, or permanent, improvement in the condition of a state, whose rulers abandon themselves to such open and disgusting debauchery, unredeemed by any of those statesmanlike qualities which distinguished the Government of the Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing.

We deem it to be essential for a just understanding of the actual condition of the Lahore Government that these details should be reported; they tend to show the unsatisfactory nature of that Government, and that our relations with a court thus constituted, and an army solely governed by Punchayets, must be in a very precarious state.

We are determined to maintain the pacific course of policy which we have hitherto pursued to the utmost extent of conciliation and forbearance.

Enclosure in No. 3.

EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS FROM THE AGENT TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ON THE North-West Frontier TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT, illustrative of the Riot and Debauchery now prevalent at the *Lahore* Durbar.

LETTER, dated June 8, 1845.

ON the 5th the Punchayets agreed to go in a body to the palace, and remonstrate against Jowahir Sing being continued in the Government, and to require that in his stead Deewan Deena Nath, or Bukhshee Bhugut Ram, or Rajah Lal Sing, or the three conjointly, should be appointed to the Vizeership—they did so, and great confusion followed. They had interviews with Jowahir Sing, whom they reproached with breach of faith to them, with drunkenness and incapacity;—they went to the Ranee and insisted on her seeing them herself, which she did; they demanded the dismissal of Jowahir Sing, and the substitution of Rajah Lal Sing, or the others named above. The Ranee referred them to the chiefs, and it was finally settled that, next day, the 6th, Rajah Lal Sing, Deewan Deena Nath, and Bukhshee Bhugut Ram, should go to the captonments and consult with the Punchayets. The troops demand gratuities, and the Ranee, if she did not help to get up the disturbance, is favourable to its ostensible objects, and the replacement of her brother by Rajah Lal Sing. The latter's sickness revived her tenderness for him, and he has used this skilfully, pretending he is afraid to visit her, as formerly, for fear of Jowahir Sing. This has made her the more eager to renew unrestricted intercourse, and of this eagerness the lover has availed himself before she changes, or grows cool.

LETTER, dated June 13.

A FORMAL reconciliation has been effected, by the Ranee, between Jowahir Sing and Rajah Lal Sing. She marked her satisfaction by sending each of them a handsome slave girl just received from the Mundee Chief, our neighbour here. Such is Sikh morality in this matter, and taste also, for Lal Sing is one of the Ranee's own lovers.

LETTER, dated June 14.

THE above news reached Lahore on the 11th, but Jowahir Sing and his favourites had been carousing with the new slave girl and other women all the previous night, so that he was too drunk to hold the Durbar, and the Chief's and Mootusudjees dispersed.

LETTER, dated June 18.

JOWAHIR SING and Lal Sing were seeking on the 14th to assassinate each other—the former was the aggressor—the cause, the Ranee's increased passion for Lal Sing since he had cholera.

LETTER, dated June 20.

AT the capital, Gholab Sing, Jowahir Sing and Lal Sing, are well engaged in plans to assassinate each other, any two joining for a day against the third.

A paramour of the Ranee has run away with about a lac of rupees worth of her jewels, to the public amusement or scandal, as the public is grave or merry.

LETTER, dated July 8.

AT Lahore they are quiet, drinking and intriguing politically and amorously.

LETTER, dated August 1.

JOWAHIR SING has finally yielded to the troops, and the Ranee made him do so, but he was drunk at the time, and may change. On the evening of the 28th there was to be a private consultation of Jowahir Sing, Gholab Sing, Rajah Lal Sing and Deewan Deena Nath.

LETTER, dated August 5.

JOWAHIR SING is always drunk, and has gone the length lately of gross and indecent abuse in Durbar to Bhace Ram Sing, whose religious character had hitherto prevented such an occurrence in the worst times; he quarrels also with the troops, and, indeed, with all but some low favourites, and Deewan Deena Nath, whose advice, however, as to answering my letter he spurned with reproaches of treachery. I believe he has for some months, and especially for the last two months, formed a drunken design or vision of war with us, after the Dusserah, as a resource to avert from himself the wrath of the army, as a means of finding money to pay them; and, not unskillfully, he tries to make the Sodees, who are very sacred characters, the ground of quarrel—therein he has, however, failed. It is quite impossible, however, to say what may be the issue of dealings with such a drunkard, acting on such troops.

LETTER, dated August 6.

WERE it not that the consequence of what is now doing at Lahore may be momentous, I should feel inclined half to laugh and half to be ashamed of having anything to do with it. It is essential that the Government should know the exact truth, and in setting before it the kind of people with whom it is now dealing, as with the chiefs of a state, it will be difficult to avoid details unfit for the decency of a despatch. The state of parties is seriously changed; but the cause is, the Ranee's mind having become seriously affected by her excesses. She has become

become stupid instead of clever and lively ; is sometimes for days in a state bordering on fatuity ; and though at times she revives, chiefly when stimulated by drinking, she takes but little concern in the public business, compared with what she used to do, and then is guided chiefly by her low paramours and servants. Now, the remnant of wise men left, hitherto prevented convulsion by their influence with the Rancee, especially the Fakeers and Bhace Ram Sing ; but this influence is all but gone in the Rancee's present state, so much so, that Bhace Ram Sing lately sent me a caution against closing a business with the existing government, as it was certain the troops, on their return after the Dusserah, would put to death Jowahir Sing and the Rancee, with her son ; he added, that they would set up Peshora Sing and Rajah Golab Sing, as king and vizier. I never even acknowledge the receipt of such communications ; but in the latest remonstrances, I have, in consequence of this, pointed out that my warnings spring from the Governor-general's friendship, and from consideration of the Maha Raja's tender years. But to proceed : on the 1st, there was no afternoon Durbar, there being a consultation of the principal personages on the English affairs ; it lasted all day, but every man of note was excluded, even Deewar Deena Nath. This council consisted of Jawahir Sing, the Rancee, and three personal attendants, domestics of Jowahir Sing, men of low origin, raised by him, one an old horse-jockey, another lately a Fakeer, and a third still a palace Peon, also Jowahir Sing's *private* Moonshee. After much debate, it was agreed to consult next day the chiefs who were used to such matters ; but it was decided that the Governor-general's letter should be answered."

LETTER, dated August 6.

THE evening Dawb, of the 2d is in ; Jowahir Sing, the Rancee, and Maha Raja, all drunk, with Raja Lal Sing ; held no Durbar on the 2d ; the consultation all forgotten ; they went out to the Shaliman Garden. My letter arriving, my vakeel carried it to the Shaliman, and ~~sent~~ word it was emergent : they refused to see him or it ; and told him to come when they were at leisure.

LETTER, dated August 7.

THOUGH the effects of the forenoon debauch were not gone off, the contents of the letter produced a dead silence, and after a time, an answer that the letter would be deliberated on, and answered without delay. This effect was produced by the warnings given not to be misled by foolish rumours.

On the 3d, there was no very marked carousing, and much debating ; so I suppose a day or two will bring some answer or other.

LETTER, dated August 8.

SIRDAR JOWAHIR SINGH and his party, after abstaining nearly a day from drinking to deliberate on my letter, made an excuse of heavy rain on the 3d ; to set out with his favourites and some generals on elephants, each supplied with a bottle of brandy ; they returned drunk, held no Durbar, and listened to no business ; but sending for dancing girls, Jowahir Sing dressed himself as a dancing girl, and danced with the rest.

LETTER, dated August 10.

ON the 7th, the deliberations were to be renewed, if deliberations they can be called. The Rancee is passive, Jowahir Singh drunk and mad, referring to his drunken companions, who recommended the conquest of India, &c. &c. ; and on the other hand, the whole of the men of consideration urge on him the necessity of making matters smooth with the English.

— No. 4. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—On the River Ganges,
off Monghyr, 30 September 1845.—(No. 2.)

(Extract.)

THE forbearance of the Government of India has been carried to an extent beyond that which has been customary. Every military precaution has, however, been taken; advice and warnings have been repeatedly conveyed to the Lahore Government in the plainest language; even the risk of giving offence by such language has been incurred, rather than fail in the essential point of clearly defining the nature of our policy, and of having that policy well understood. I am convinced that our desire to see the Maha Rajah's government re-established on a basis of independence and strength, is well known to the most influential and leading chiefs. Their personal interests, endangered by the democratic revolution, so successfully accomplished by the Sikh army, may induce those chiefs to exert all their efforts to compel the British Government to interfere; but these attempts, and any danger resulting from them, will be attributable, not to our forbearance, but to their personal fears for life and property.

You may be assured that, whilst I shall omit no precautions, and be prepared for any event, I shall persevere in the direct course I have hitherto pursued, of endeavouring by moderation, good faith and friendly advice, to avert the necessity of British interference by force of arms in the affairs of the Punjab.

— No. 5. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—On the Ganges,
proceeding to Barr, 1 October 1845.—(No. 4.)

(Extract.)

THERE seems to be very little doubt that General Chutter Singh Attarecuala did, after much hesitation, enter into the views of the Wuzzeer Jowahir Singh, and cause the Koonwur Peshora Singh to be put to death on his way from Attock to Lahore.

The leading men at Lahore expect that this event will so greatly excite the indignation of the regular troops around Lahore, as to induce them to rise against the minister Jowahir Singh. The minister, to ward off the blow, is represented as being determined to bring about a collision with our troops on the frontier, and had given orders for three brigades of infantry to be prepared to march towards the Sutlege.

On the 12th September, it would further appear that the leading chiefs met Bhaee Ram Singh, in concert with them, and, in open Durbar, made a solemn and bold remonstrance against the course of policy pursued by Jowahir Singh in his recent relations with the British Government. In his address, he openly and fully admitted that, in the existing discussions with our Political Agent, the right to resist the Durbar's pretensions was clearly on the side of the British; that the Minister was, by his orders, violating all the customary rules by which their intercourse with the British authorities had hitherto been regulated; and that these attempts to set our authority at defiance had been met, on our part, in a spirit remarkable for its moderation and forbearance.

It is understood that the Minister agreed to retrace his steps, and that letters apologizing for the past would be immediately addressed to the Political Agent.

During the night of the 12th September, the Minister, having been engaged, according to custom, in hard drinking, first heard of Peshora Singh's disappearance and probable death; he instantly resolved to persevere in his course of precipitating collision with the British troops on the frontier.

This determination was met by renewed remonstrances, and it would appear that Bhaee Ram had caused the news of the death of Peshora Singh to be reported to the troops, and that the party adverse to Jowahir Singh were acting with boldness and energy to defeat the desperate resolution of the Minister; the latter continuing to declare that he would gratify the Sikh army by leading them against the English, rather than die the death of a dog at Lahore.

The impression made on my mind is, that there will be no attack or violation of our frontier by the Sikh forces. Their anger against the Minister for causing the assassination of Peshora Singh, contrary to their injunctions signified to the Minister and to the General, by sending their Punchayets to Chuttur Singh's camp for the prince's protection, will probably induce them, on that pretence, to bring about a revolution at Lahore, putting Jowahir Singh to death, and, if the proscription extends to the Regent and her son, the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, in that case the child Shah Deo, the son of the late Maharajah Shere Singh, will be declared the sovereign of the Punjaub.

The regular force at Lahore, on the 12th September, does not amount to 15,000 men. The larger proportion of the army would not have returned from furlough until the beginning of October. Assuming that the Sikh troops are desirous of being led against the English, an assumption more than doubtful, their present state of inefficiency is too palpable to encourage them to undertake such a risk at the bidding and under the command of a minister who at this moment is an object of their hatred and contempt, and whose anti-English policy has been publicly denounced in Durbar as fatal to the State, by the most influential chiefs.

For these reasons, I do not expect any immediate rupture; at the same time, after such decisive proofs of the hostile intentions of the Maharajah's minister, it will be prudent not to relax in those precautionary measures which, in concurrence with my colleagues, I considered it expedient to adopt in the course of last spring, when the frontier stations were reinforced by European and native troops.

I shall pursue my journey to Allahabad, and thence to Agra, according to my original intention on leaving Calcutta, not deeming it expedient or necessary to accelerate it, and you may be assured that no efforts shall be wanting to repress all manifestations of hostility against the Sikhs, should any such be displayed, by patiently and firmly carrying out, to the utmost extent of forbearance, the pacific policy of the Government.

— No. 6. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Agra, 23 October 1845.

(No. 5.)

(Extract.)

THE result anticipated by me in my letter of the 1st instant has taken place. The Sikh soldiery having formally called the late Minister Jowahir Sing to account for the destruction of Koonwur Peshora Sing, and for his other misdeeds, put him to death on the 21st September.

The circumstances under which the destruction of Jowahir Sing was accomplished are related in Major Broadfoot's despatch of the 26th ultimo, a paper which cannot be perused without much interest.

As I expected, the violent removal of Jowahir Sing has not led to any circumstances likely to bring about a collision with us, or to compromise the nominal Government at Lahore in its relations with the British power.

On the contrary, the disposition of the remaining chiefs appears evidently to be to maintain, as far as possible, the former relations with us, and to make atonement for the unfriendly acts of the late Jowahir Sing; while the soldiery, the openly-avowed administrators of the Government, though they talk largely of their intentions with regard to our army, show plainly, by their acts, they are fully aware that any attempt to force hostile measures upon us must be an act which would at once seal their own destruction.

The Dusserah festival has passed without carrying with it further convulsions or bloodshed.

The state of affairs, however, cannot fail to exhibit the hopelessness of our seeing a permanent government established in the Punjaub out of the elements that now exist there, capable of conducting the administration of the country, and reducing the army to a state of subordination and control.

The Ranee has been declared Regent, and at present carries on the government, if such it can be called, at the dictation of the Punchayets of the army.

No Minister has yet been nominated, and it seems doubtful whether the Ranee's favourite, Raja Lall Sing, or Rajah Golab Sing, may be the next person called to that ill-omened distinction; probably the former will be the first nominated, as the very deeply-laid schemes of Golab Sing appear hardly yet ripe for his accession, though there can be little doubt that eventually he looks to acquiring full power in the Punjab, and entertains the hope, that he may be able, with better success than his nephew, Heera Sing, to reduce the army within the limits of its legitimate duties.

Enclosure in No. 6.

The AGENT to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL on the North-West Frontier to the SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of India.

(Extract.)

Camp, Simla, 26 September 1845.

THE troops continued on the 18th and subsequent days to maintain the same attitude as before, perfect order among themselves and strict discipline towards the city and its neighbourhood. They pitched their camp at the plain of Mujan Meer, on the Ferozepore side of Lahore, where the Puchayets held their nightly meetings, and in the morning issued the orders determined on, under the designation belonging to the Sikh sect, before Runjeet Singh became a monarch, viz., the Khalsa Punth, (Khalsajee da Punth). They formally assumed the government, and sent letters bearing their seal, inscribed merely with the name of God, to all local officers, military leaders and members of the Durbar, requiring their presence and obedience. They sent similar letters to the Ranee, requiring her to join their camp with her son, and to deliver up her brother and the murderers of Peshora Singh, if he were really dead. The Ranee justified his death, which her brother had denied. The troops answered that her admission proved it, and required her to choose between giving him up or sharing his fate with her sons.

In such negotiations were passed the intermediate days. Sirdar Jowahir Sing trusted to holding the fort with his new levies and the artillery, of which the superior officers were much in his favour; but he found that, including the Englishman, or, as he himself says, the American Colonel Gardener, the troops and their officers were ready to obey the summons of the troops, and to join their camp; he now began to think of escape, and laboured in every way to gain time and conciliate the levies, that they might at least connive at his flight.

On the 19th he and the Ranee sent Deewan Deena Nath, Faqueer Noor-ood-deen, and Sirdar Ultur Singh Kalewala, to urge the troops to return to their obedience on account of the danger of English invasion, &c. The troops immediately made them prisoners, releasing Noor-ood-deen, whom they sent to warn the Ranee that the 20th was the latest day to which the option of surrendering her brother would be left to her; that this delay was only given to spare the city the miseries of a siege of the fort; and that she and her son would pay with their lives the penalty of such siege, if their obstinacy made it necessary. At the same time, under the seal of the Punth, they required the troops in the fort to take care that no one escaped, and they posted guards at each gate of the city for the like purpose. Fakeer Noor-ood-deen, having fulfilled his mission, was honourably dismissed; the other prisoners were insulted, threatened and derided by the soldiery.

On the night of the 20th, Sirdar Jowahir Sing made great presents and greater promises to his troops, giving one General half a lack of rupees to facilitate his escape. They allowed him to reach the gate of the fort, where the guard peremptorily forbade him to go further, saying, that such were the orders of the Khalsa Punth. The Sirdar returned to his house in despair.

In the afternoon of the 21st, it was announced that four battalions had left the camp to destroy all in the fort, of which the garrison, with all the artillery and generals, had marched to the camp of Mujan Meer. Immediate departure for the camp was announced to be the only chance of safety. The Sirdar, his sister, and her son, with all the members of Durbar who had not already gone to the camp, now mounted on the state elephants, and proceeded to join the troops, their tents having been already sent on. The four battalions which they met turned

turned back in silence and escorted them to the camp. When they arrived there it had become dark. The Ranee, the Maharajah and their immediate attendants, except the slave Mungla, were conducted to their tents by the troops, which ran tumultuously to them from every part. Sirdar Jowahir Singh was put to death in his howdah, by innumerable wounds of swords and muskets, and his body thrown out on the ground. Two of his leading associates, Bhyar Chutter, a door-keeper, and Bawa Ruttun Singh Bedee, a chabrook sower (a horse-jockey), were also put to death, as well as some orderly horsemen, much consulted on state affairs by the Sirdar. Of the rest of his attendants, most escaped in the dark. Rajah Lal Singh was made a prisoner, as also Sirdar Jewun Singh, a man of low station, a native of Majecto, but for some years a Hindoo Faqeer, in Rohilcund. Mungla, the slave, was also imprisoned, as well as a few others of less note. Sirdar Lal Singh Mararuja, who was designated to command the expedition against the English, fled, and is believed to have crossed the Sutledge. He was, on Heera Singh's death, only a risaldar of orderly horse, and raised by Jewahir Singh first to be a General and then a Sirdar, with a view sometimes of going as a special ambassador to the English, and sometimes of commanding an army to invade them. General Mehtal Singh Majeetea, and others of that family, lately leaders at the Durbar, are in concealment, and orders were sent to bring Lal Singh Adawlahee a prisoner from the Sutledge bank opposite to Ferozepore. Thus the whole of the members of the late government were either slain, imprisoned or fugitives.

On the morning of the 22d, the Ranee, who has still great influence with the troops, reproached them for the death of her brother, and threatened to destroy herself and her son. The Punchayet released Deewan Deena Nath and Ultur Singh Kaleewala, with orders to soothe the Ranee. After some time, she and her son, and their attendants, came out to where the body of Jewahir Singh was lying almost cut to pieces. The Ranee and her women broke out into violent lamentations, which moved the soldiers so much that they permitted her and her son to return to the fort, carrying with her the Sirdar's body. They also allowed Deewan Deena Nath and Sirdar Ultur Singh Kaleewala to accompany her.

The body was carried, first to the fort, and then to the burning place, where, amidst a great concourse of people, four of the Sirdar's wives were burned with it. The crowd was so great on the way from the fort, that they broke the order of the procession, and two companies of sepoys on duty with it, during the confusion, plundered the Sirdar's wives of all the jewels and ornaments with which they were decked for the occasion, and which were intended for distribution to Brahmins and others at the pile. Suttees are sacred, and receive worship; their last words are considered prophetic, their blessing eagerly sought for, and their curses dreaded. Deewan Deenanath, the Ranee, the Maharaja and others prostrated themselves before them, and obtained their blessing. This was repeated at the pile by Deewan Deenanath, and by the Ranee, and her sowree by proxy. The Suttees blessed them, but cursed the Sikh Punth. At the pile they were asked the fate of the Punjab, and declared that, during the present year, its independence would cease, that the Sikh sect would be conquered, the wives of the Sikh soldiery be widows, and the country desolate; but that the Ranee and her son would live long and happily, and the Maharaja continue to reign. These prophecies made a great impression on the superstitious multitude, and I mention them on that account, and because they doubtless express the opinions of persons about the Durbar.

At noon of the 22d my latest letters left Lahore; a company of infantry had arrived at the fort to demand Deewan Deenanath and Sirdar Ultur Singh Kaleewala, but with what intent was not known. The troops had that morning put Raja Lal Singh in irons, as having dishonoured the Ranee "the mother of all Sikhs." They had also made Deewan Deenanath announce, in their name, to all governors and officers the death of Jowahir Singh, and had consented to do the same to the Vakeels with me; but they had forbidden any communication directly to me, saying that in future no letter to the English was to be written till the army had deliberated on its contents. They declared, however, that they desired peace, but that if troops marched from our stations to Loodianah and Ferozepore, they would march too; if not, that each power should keep its own territory in peace.

They give out that Raja Gholab Singh is to have the Wuzeership, only on condition of increasing their pay, and making a considerable donation; but till

the party of chiefs which is moving them through the Panchayets, shall decide on its next step, little reliance is to be placed on what they may say. For the present, however, there is no recognized head of the Government except the Panchayets of the army, which have not for some days used the name of the Maharajah at all; and the voice of the troops was, on the 22d, for remaining in this state till the Dusserah, when they propose to nominate a Government to carry on ordinary business under the Panchayets. They have named one of the minor Sirdars, Mujan Pirthee Singh, a relation of the Jummoo family, who has, without appearing, been deep in the intrigues of the last few months.

—No. 7.—

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Camp, Muttra,
November 6, 1845.—(No. 8.)

(Extract.)

THE Ranee continues to carry on the Government in her own name as regent for her son; she consults alternately Dewan Dina Nath and Bhaee Ram Sing, with Rajah Lall Sing, and endeavours to play off the one against the other, while she, with the concurrence of the army, governs in person as the army pleases.

She is said to have shown much spirit and energy on more than one occasion lately; and to have laid aside to a great extent all debaucheries with her veil; she now appears openly to her troops, and in public generally; and has been leading a more regular life, desiring that it may be thought she devotes herself to state affairs.

In the meantime dissensions are beginning to show themselves amongst the troops; Courts's brigade having divided itself into two parties, with separate interests.

The small amount of money remaining in the treasuries is becoming notorious; and many excesses have been committed by the troops on their return from leave. Two generals have been beaten, and turned out of the camp, and demands made on the Ranee for generals of the troops' own selection and nomination.

Sirdar Tej Sing has returned from Peshawar, and is intriguing on his own account, while Rajah Golab Sing continues to strengthen himself, and to watch events. He has lately entertained a large number of Afghan troops. Confidential agents, with overtures from different parties, have been endeavouring to open communications with the agent, who, as before instructed, hears what every person has to say to him, but gives no sort of encouragement to any one.

—No. 8.—

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Camp, Delhi,
November 18, 1845.—(No. 9.)

(Extract.)

No material change in the state of parties or affairs at Lahore has taken place.

The Ranee, taking with her the young Maharaja, went in person to Umritsir, to endeavour to induce the Killedar at Govindgurh to make over to her a part of the treasure there, to meet the demands of the troops for their pay.

After much discussion and intrigue 20 lacs of rupees were promised, whereof 10 lacs were placed at the Ranee's disposal.

Before the remaining 10 lacs could be obtained, news arrived from Lahore that

that the troops there had given out that the Ranee and young Maharaja had absconded, and that preparations were in forwardness for proclaiming the infant son of the late Shere Sing Maharaja, and for appointing Rajah Golab Sing minister.

This caused the Ranee and her party to return forthwith to Lahore, where they are said to have arrived just in time to arrest the progress of these proceedings; and her presence and energetic behaviour appear to have restored her influence for the time.

The 10 lacs brought from Govindghur have been made over to the pay department; and the arrangements by assignments, &c. which the Ranee was making, would, it was thought, enable her to meet the present demands of the troops.

I send the copy of an official communication (secret) which I have made to the Commander-in-Chief, relating to commissariat arrangements for a portion of the army stationed on the frontier during the present season. My reasons for making these arrangements are contained in the letter to his Excellency.

Enclosure in No. 8.

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. —Agra, October 24, 1845.

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, on or before the 12th of November arrangements will have been made by which the commissariat department will be prepared to equip nearly two-thirds of the force at, and in advance of, Meerut, with the necessary means of marching at the shortest notice.

The extent to which it may be expedient to be prepared with this description of equipment must always be dependent on contingent events, which fluctuate, in an unsettled Government like that of Lahore, in a manner which defies all ordinary calculations of probable results.

In the present state of our relations with the Lahore Government, your Excellency is aware that I do not anticipate the probability of any emergencies arising which can require the army, under your Excellency's orders, to take the field this autumn.

Nevertheless, having to deal with a mutinous Sikh army, which has usurped the functions of the Government, and whose caprice may, at any time, force on a rupture with our forces on the frontier, I have deemed it advisable to be prepared with the means of movement to the extent noted in the margin;* and as it is desirable that the arrangement should be made on the most economical scale, the whole will be hired at the halting rates.

If, as I expect, the tone of the Lahore Durbar should continue to be more friendly, as has been the case since Sirdar Jowahir Sing's death, I shall be anxious, according to events, gradually to diminish the scale of the present preparation, which, as before, is strictly of a defensive character.

No provision has been made for the baggage animals of the European officers, according to the decision of the Government of India last year. The number required would probably exceed 1,200 camels.

Lieutenant-colonel Parsons, the Deputy Commissary-general, will be instructed to communicate with your Excellency on this subject, and will postpone his usual tour of inspection for one month.

- * 7 Troops of Horse Artillery.
- 6 Companies Foot Artillery.
- 4 Light Field Batteries.
- 2 Regiments of Dragoons.
- 3 Regiments of Light Cavalry.
- 5 Regiments European Infantry.
- 13 Regiments Native Infantry.
- 6 Companies Sappers and Miners.
- 2 Regiments Irregular Cavalry.

—No. 9.—

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Camp, Umballa,
December 2, 1845.—(No. 15.)

(Extract.)

I LEFT Delhi on the 19th ultimo, making the usual marches towards Kurnaul and Umballa, with the intention of meeting the Commander-in-Chief at the latter place, who was on his way to inspect the troops at Meerut, Delhi and other districts.

On the 22d November I received from Major Broadfoot the official despatch dated the 20th November, detailing the sudden intention of the Sikh army to advance in force to the frontier, for the avowed purpose of invading the British territories.

The letter of the 20th was succeeded by a private communication of the following day, stating the same facts, and enclosing news, letters and papers of intelligence received from Lahore, which professed to give an account of the circumstances which have led to the present movement, and which would appear (if these papers are to be depended upon) to have originated with the Rancee, and certain of the Sirdars, who felt the pressure of the demands of the army to be so urgent, and its present attitude and temper so perilous to their existence, that they desired to turn the thoughts of the troops to objects which might divert their attention from making extortionate demands for higher pay, by employing their energies in hostile operations against the British Government.

The precautions already adopted to provide against the possibility of our forces being unprepared to meet any movement of the Sikh army this season, and the arrangements made by the Commander-in-Chief on the receipt of Major Broadfoot's intelligence, rendered it, in my opinion, unnecessary to allow these reports of invasion to make any change in my movements. I arrived on the 26th at Kurnaul, where the Commander-in-Chief met me, having proceeded from Umballa by Dak, returning to his camp the same evening; on the same day I was also joined by Major Broadfoot.

I had the satisfaction of concurring in all the orders which his Excellency had given, to hold the troops in readiness to move at the shortest notice, and in the instructions which he had sent to the officers in command of the stations at Ferozepore and Loodiana. The force at the former post consists of one European regiment, seven regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, and 24 field guns, exclusive of heavy ordnance. The force at Loodiana consists of one regiment of Europeans, five regiments of native infantry, one regiment of native cavalry, and two troops of horse artillery.

After a full and satisfactory consultation with his Excellency, and taking into consideration the improbability of the Sikh army crossing the Sutlege, I determined that no movement should be made towards the river by the forces from Umballa and Meerut, and I postponed, for further consideration with his Excellency, any change in the present distribution of the troops; eventually some alterations will be made, which, when they have been finally determined upon between me and the Commander-in-Chief, will be reported to you. At the present moment his Excellency coincides with me that no forward movement is required.

In the midst of much hesitation and irresolution, the enterprise ordered by the Sikh Government does not appear to have been formally abandoned; the intelligence received by Major Broadfoot on the day of his joining my camp showed that three brigades of the Sikh force had actually left Lahore a few miles in advance, to be followed the next morning by three other brigades, including one of artillery. This was on the 24th ultimo. The intelligence received from that date has been communicated to me by Major Broadfoot each day, as it arrives.

It is said they intend, in reply to Major Broadfoot's remonstrance, to allege that the fact of our having collected so large a force, with all the munitions of war, on the frontier, is the cause of the concentration of their forces on the Sutlege; that they intend to demand the reasons of our preparations; to insist on the surrender to the Lahore Government of the treasure which belonged to the late Raja Soocheyt Sing; the restoration by the Raja of Nabba of the village of Mowran, escheated by the Raja, and the escheat confirmed by us; and henceforth the free passage of their troops into the Lahore possessions on this side the Sutlege.

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I need only remark, on the first and most essential point, that the Sikh army did in the beginning of last January prepare to move to the Sutledge. The political agent remonstrated, and the troops were withdrawn; the reason then assigned for the movement being the same as that now intended to be brought forward, namely, the state of our military preparations on the frontier. The Governor-general in Council, in a despatch to Major Broadfoot of the 25th January* 1845, entered into very full explanations, which were conveyed to the Lahore Vakeel.

The Government of India, through its Political Agent, has more than once complained of the inconvenience and expense of being obliged to retain so large a British force on the frontier, in consequence of the ungovernable misconduct of the Sikh army,—a fact well known and never contradicted by the Lahore Government.

As regards the past, it is clear that no cause of complaint has been given by the Government of India. If it should be asserted that our military preparations this autumn have given offence, the assertion is equally unfounded, and is a mere pretext for hostile proceedings which have originated in the political weakness and the internal dissensions of the Lahore Government, and, above all, in their desire to be released, on any terms, from the terror which the ferocity of their own troops has inspired. The proof is to be found in the fact that, at the time these disorderly movements commenced, no additional British troops had reached our frontier stations. The additional regiment of native infantry, destined for the reinforcement of Ferozepoor, had not arrived. At Loodiana, one of the two regiments of native cavalry had actually marched for Sind before it was relieved, leaving that post, as it is at present, with one regiment, instead of the usual complement of two regiments of cavalry. At the other stations no alterations had been made, and the troops which had marched were peaceably engaged in completing the annual reliefs according to custom at this season.

I have given these details to show the hollow pretences of such assertions if they should be made.

I do not believe that this alleged grievance, or any of the other demands, will be made, or, if made, that they will be pressed, but I need not say that they will and must be resisted.

Such is the state of affairs at the present moment, and, although my conviction is strong that the Sikh army will be deterred from acts of aggression on account of the state of our military preparation, yet it is by no means impossible that we may be forced at any moment into war, and that operations on a very extended scale may be immediately necessary.

For this alternative I have made all preparations. Orders will be despatched to bring up from stations in the rear of Meerut the additional forces noted in the margin,* which, with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, will be cantoned, with the exception of the European artillery, at or near Kimna, 28 miles from Loodiana, and 10 miles in advance of Suhind. This intention will not be divulged at the present moment, pending events at Lahore, and no step will be taken calculated to excite alarm which in prudence can be dispensed with. The Commissariat arrangements are nearly complete, on a scale adapted for defensive purposes, enabling the forces to march in any direction, at the shortest notice.

My views and measures will be anxiously directed to avoid a recourse to arms as long as it may be possible. On this point my determination is fixed. At the same time it is very apparent, from the general aspect of affairs, that the period is fast approaching when further changes will take place at Lahore, and that the weak Government of the regent will be subverted by the violence of the troops, instigated by the intrigues of the party favourable to the Raja Golab Sing.

Up to the present hour, no act of open hostility has been committed.

I shall not consider the march of the Sikh troops in hostile array towards the banks of the Sutledge as a cause justifying hostilities, if no actual violation of our frontier should occur. The same privilege which we take to adopt precautionary measures on our side must be conceded to them. Every forbearance shall be shown to a weak Government struggling for assistance against its own soldiers in a state of successful mutiny.

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* The letter referred to is the next in this collection.

I have no cause to doubt the loyalty of our admirable native army, but I have every reason to believe that endeavours have been systematically made, on a very extensive scale, to tamper with them; that promises of promotion and reward have been lavishly made; and that their religious prejudices have been forcibly appealed to.

Some chiefs of influence on this side, and with estates on both sides of the river, are anxious to come forward to prove themselves unconnected with the present movement against us, and to evince their adherence to our interests. The answer I have desired may be given to them is, that we do not anticipate that the Sikhs will proceed to unprovoked hostilities; but that, should such be the case, the parties who have estates on our side the Sutledge, and prove by their conduct their true adherence to the British Government, will be protected from any consequences to which such conduct might render them liable on account of their position in the Punjaub.

I have every reason to be satisfied with the ability, energy and sound judgment displayed by Major Broadfoot in the course of these proceedings.

LETTER referred to in No. 9.

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S Agent.

Sir,

Fort William, 25 January 1845.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of the copy of your letter of the 15th instant,* addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of the alarms which prevailed at Lahore when you wrote, and the movement of troops towards the Sutledge, in consequence of certain rumours of orders alleged to have been issued by the Commander-in-Chief at Umballa.

2. In the absence of information of the orders which may have been given by the Commander-in-Chief, and which probably his Excellency could not have avoided giving, the Governor-general in Council is disposed to attribute this manifestation of alarm in some measure to the successful intrigues of the party of Gholab Singh at Lahore, which party, by detaching a portion of the Sikh army towards the Sutledge, would weaken its efforts, then about to be directed in operations against that Rajah.

3. Another cause which may have had some weight in the above movement, may be the anxiety of the Lahore Government to get rid of an army which is more formidable to its friends than its enemies, from the immediate vicinity of the seat of Government; and it may be convenient to ascribe this movement to the orders for military preparations issued at Umballa.

4. Be this as it may, the Governor-general in Council desires me to refer you to the letter, Secret Department, of the 10th instant, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, of which a copy was sent with my Despatch of the same date, No. 17, and to beg you forthwith to state to the Durbar the exact truth, as follows:

5. That a barrack for a European regiment of infantry had for a length of time been ordered to be constructed at Ferozepore, of which the foundations are already laid; that the Governor-general in Council, perceiving during the autumn the state of weakness in which the Government of the Maharajah had been for some time, under his Highness Wuzzeer Rajah Heera Singh, had postponed to give orders for the completion of this building, in order that no question might arise, exciting any doubt or jealousy of our intention, on the part of the Government of the Maharajah or of the Sikh army.

6. That the British force stationed at Ferozepore has remained of the same strength as before, notwithstanding the recent violent proceedings of the Sikh army against its own Government, which conduct it is unnecessary now to comment upon, otherwise than to repeat that it is conduct utterly repugnant to British feeling and British policy; and that this army has become so notoriously beyond control, that the Governor-general in Council, always anxious to preserve the tranquillity of the Sikh states under his protection, will, under existing circumstances, now proceed to complete the buildings at Ferozepore according to his

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* This letter is the next in this collection.

original intention, and also to reinforce that post by an additional force of native infantry.

7. You are requested to impress on the Vakeel, that the same forbearance has been shown since the death of the Wuzeer Rajah Heera Singh, in order to evince the friendly feeling of the Governor-general in Council towards the Maharajah, in proof of which you will advert to the sentiments expressed in the Governor-general in Council's letter to your address, and which you were desired to convey as from yourself to the Vakeel of the 15th instant, stating that if any attempts be made by violent proceedings to bring about any change, such as the army proclaiming Peshwa Sing as successor to his Highness the Maharajah, whom the British Government has recognized, that you would not feel yourself justified in recognizing, without special orders, a chief whose power had been acquired by such means.

8. You will observe to the Vakeel that, in despite of the friendly conduct of the Governor-general in Council, a portion of the Sikh army has been moved towards the Sutledge, on the pretext of rumours from the cantonments of Umballah; and you will say, that the Governor-general in Council advises the Maharajah's Government to disregard rumours and newspaper reports, over which the Governor-general in Council exercises no control.

9. You will impress upon the Durbar Vakeel that you possess the confidence of the Governor-general in Council, and that your instructions are to declare the truth plainly to his Highness's Government, reiterating the same sentiments as those conveyed by your predecessor, that the Governor-general in Council has a sincere desire to see a strong Government re-established at Lahore, such as that which existed in the time of our faithful ally, his Highness Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

10. Having taken the opportunity which this movement of Sikh troops towards the Sutledge so suitably affords, of declaring our intentions as to the military arrangements about to be made at Ferozepore, you will state that the British Government does not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Punjab; that the Governor-general in Council regrets the embarrassments under which the Sikh Government at present labours, and sincerely trusts that they may be overcome by firmness and prudence.

11. In making these communications, you will modify them, if necessary, in reference to any events which have occurred in the interval which must unavoidably elapse before your receipt of them, taking care not to commit the Government of India to any line of action involving any principle of policy not in accordance with the spirit of your instructions.

12. You will continue to do every thing in your power to convince the Government of Lahore of the good faith of the Government of India, so as to enable the Sikh Government to direct the efforts of their army to the legitimate object of coercing its enemies; and, if the opportunity should occur, you will, without exciting any irritation, but in the most friendly terms, state that the Governor-general in Council has, in consideration of the difficult circumstances in which the Government of the Maharajah is placed, and for other obvious reasons, hitherto forbore to make the unruly and ungovernable condition of the Sikh army a subject of formal remonstrance to the Maharajah. The Governor-general in Council trusts that a returning sense of the duty which the army owes to the Maharajah may avert the necessity of his taking any such step, and that he may hear that which will be much more gratifying to him, that it has obediently marched against his Highness's enemies, and honourably fulfilled the true functions of an army, by supporting the just authority of its Sovereign and his Government.

13. You will understand that this caution, although incidentally given, will be distinctly delivered. The state of this army, the Governor-general in Council observes, so close upon our frontier, may become an intolerable nuisance; and although it would be a mockery to expect that the Lahore Government, in the state of anarchy and weakness in which it at present can scarcely be said to exist, can regulate the conduct of an army which exercises over that Government daily acts of coercion and tyranny; nevertheless, the Governor-general in Council deems it expedient that a notice, in the most guarded terms, should be given of the great inconvenience to which the British Government is exposed, and of which, if the

Lahore Government was in a state of greater strength and responsibility, the Governor-general in Council would justly have cause to complain.

14. You will observe, in the letter of the Governor-general in Council to the Commander-in-Chief, of the 10th January, that the reinforcements, European and native, to be posted at Ferozepore, were not to be moved up by the Commander-in-Chief, unless on a report of an emergency from yourself; and that, in that letter to the Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-general in Council would be satisfied if the reinforcements were posted towards the end of March and April—so short a time before the river would become unfordable as to be no longer a source of uneasiness to the Sikh Government, and at the same time placing our advanced post in that condition to be able to defend the post and the passage of the river, in which, under existing circumstances, it ought at all times to remain.

15. I am directed to take this opportunity to send you a copy of papers, by which you will be apprized that two additional native regiments of infantry have been ordered up, making the additional four between Meerut and the Sutlej, one European regiment, two battalions of European artillery, seven regiments of native infantry, and one N. I. horse artillery.

16. This movement of the Sikh army towards the Sutlej and its mutinous ungovernable state, will be your answer to any questions which may arise as to British reinforcements arriving on the Sutlej or its immediate neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

F. Currie.

LETTER referred to in the preceding Letter.

THE POLITICAL AGENT to the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Camp, Laskar-Khas-kee-Serai,
January 15, 1845.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Excellency's information, a translation of an extract from Lahore Intelligence received last night.

2. Coming immediately after the reports respecting European troops, which I had yesterday the honour of mentioning, this caused extreme excitement, and among other resolutions, one was to demand explanations from me. In order to enable me to meet these demands if made, I beg that your Excellency will do me the favour of saying whether there has been any thing of the kind described as having occurred at Umballa, or whether the whole is not mere idle rumour.

3. A second despatch, arrived this evening, brings further intelligence on this subject, and I regret that in consequence of these appearances of preparation, our position with respect to the Durbar is materially and unfavourably changed from what it was three days before, and that there is now more risk of collision than there has been yet, seeing that the Ranee, from circumstances not unlikely to deceive her, and others, suspects that we are in co-operation with her enemies, and had appealed to the troops at Lahore, communicating to them the report of the order for preparation at Umballa, ascribed to your Excellency, and the troops have offered to do whatever she will sanction against the English.

4. But, though there is more risk of disturbance now than formerly, and though our intercourse with the Lahore state is, for the moment, embarrassed, yet I beg, with the utmost deference to your Excellency's better judgment, to state that I consider nothing as yet likely to occur, and indeed very little to be at present possible, which could lead me to do more than make the application usual in such cases for support from the officer commanding the division, and that I do not even now propose, as far as matters have yet gone, to call on him to do more than maintain his usual vigilance.

5. The bulk of the Lahore army had been lately sent by this Government, in reliance on our good faith, against the Jummoo Rajas, and towards Cashmeer and the country beyond the Jhelum, which is disturbed: supposing the Durbar to collect every man in Lahore and its vicinity, including the garrison of Umritsir and other detachments, to countermand the march of the troops now proceeding to

to Jummo, and allowing nothing for men on leave, or sick, or false musters, they can only collect of regular troops as follows :—

Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	12,200
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	1,200
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	1,530

TOTAL - - - 14,930

a number inferior, I believe, to that of the troops in the Sirhind division, and in a state of such utter disorder that their nominal leaders cannot get them to face the armed peasantry of Jessotas, nor do anything but plunder the people, insult and beat their officers, and return at will to their own homes. In addition to this, they have, however, the following undisciplined troops :—

Irregular infantry, 1,500; two battalions of Heera Singh's hill-men, who have joined the Sikhs for high pay, and have received muskets, and are now at drill :

Irregular horse, 4,750, including those at Umritsir, detached to the Sutledge, Jaghurdars, &c.

I think that the most probable source of disturbance will be, that the restriction to 14 miles from Lahore of their troops detached towards the Sutledge will be withdrawn, and that this disorderly rabble will interrupt the dawks, and commit outrages on the south side of the river, as well as on the north; but it will be most likely in a way not easily distinguished from ordinary gang robberies and forays.

I have, &c.

(signed) G. Broadfoot.

TRANSLATION OF AN EXTRACT FROM THE LAHORE AKHBAR.

The newswriter of Umballa reported through that the officers and men of the English force had on their parades received an order from the exalted in rank the Commander-in-chief of the English armies, that the whole of the victorious troops should remain continually ready, for it was uncertain how soon they might be called on to march, and that they must be in light marching order, so that they may be able to march with every thing necessary at four hours' notice; and the whole force in the cantonments looks for further orders to march, and the English, agreeably to the orders of the Commander-in-chief, are all busy in preparing what is necessary for a march in light order; and it is the rumour that the march is to take place very shortly on further orders being issued, and that it is to be towards Ferozepore; and the gentleman of Umballa has been instructed (advised) respecting the procuring of carts and camels, and other carriages, in order that he may collect them through the vakeels of the different Sardars.

Enclosure No. 1, in No. 9.

The AGENT to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the LAHORE VAKEEL RAJEE
KISHUR CHUND.

Umballa, 18 November 1845.

The friendship and alliance now for many years subsisting between the two powers, according to the established rules, is well known to all the world, and may God grant that it increase daily.

At this time a very general report prevails in the Punjaub which has extended to the districts of Loodiana and Ferozepore, and has now reached me, and it behoves me, on account of the existing relations of friendship, to make it known to you.

The report alluded to is this, that the Durbar first ordered the regular army to advance towards the Sutledge, the limits of the two states, for objects at variance with

existing treaties. The regular army, however, refused, and the same orders were then given to the irregular army, which has acquiesced.

The policy of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing in this respect is known to all men, and especially to you, as an old servant of the state, that his Highness never moved a small portion of men towards the Jalunder Doab without previous intimation to the agent, and never advanced a larger force without first ascertaining the wishes of the agent on the subject.

The reported intention of the Durbar is therefore improper, and at variance with existing relations of friendship, and can scarcely be believed. With reference, however, to late proceedings of some of the officers of the Durbar, which took place some four or five months since, it is not impossible that it may be true. I therefore now place explicitly in writing what I formerly mentioned to you, as I am bound to do by existing rules of friendship,—

That the fact of my army exhibiting a hostile purpose is incompatible with friendly relations.

If the purpose of the parties concerned be merely the destruction of that army, they entertain a mistaken notion; for the sender of the troops, whether openly or secretly, must be necessarily considered as implicated with them, for a ruler is responsible for the acts of his army or subjects. If the troops of any government are enemies, then the government to which they belong is also an enemy. The prowess of the British Government, and the strictness with which it maintains the rules of friendship, are well known to the Sikh Durbar. Communicate to me immediately whatever may come to your knowledge on this subject.

G. Broadfoot.

Enclosure No. 2, in No. 9.

The POLITICAL AGENT to the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Sir,

Governor-general's Agency,
20 November 1845.

SINCE I had the honour of waiting on your Excellency to-day, I have received Lahore letters of the 18th instant (morning.)

During the night of the 17th the chiefs had agreed on, and the Durbar had ordered in writing, the following plan of operations:

The army was to be divided into seven divisions, one to remain at Lahore, and the rest to proceed against Roopar and our hills, Lodianah, Hurreekee, Ferozepore, and Scinde, while one was to proceed to Peshawer; and a force under Rajah Golab Singh was to be sent to Attock.

Each division was to be of 8,000 to 12,000 men against Ferozepore, under Sham Sing Attarewallah, whose estates adjoin the place against which it was to act. Against Hurreekee is to go Rajah Lal Singh; against Loodeeanah, Sirdar Tej Singh, the new Commander-in-chief; and against Roopar, a brother of Sena Sing Mujeetea.

The force under Sham Singh is to be 4,000 horse, and two brigades of infantry, with guns; under Raja Lal Singh, 4,500 horse, and two infantry brigades; under Sirdar Tej Singh, four brigades of infantry (one of them irregulars, and one new levies), and 1,000 horse, &c.; but till the plans of the Durbar are in actual execution, they cannot be considered fixed, and therefore I do not trouble your Excellency with further details.

With respect to the probability of their actually moving, I must say that my correspondents in Lahore seem to doubt it, though they are perplexed. The causes, however, which have so suddenly led the Durbar to such lengths, may carry it further; and indeed it is difficult to see how they can stop now without a change of government; a thing not unlikely; still prudence requires that we should act as if they would not change their minds, and I therefore most respectfully venture to submit to your Excellency the following suggestions:

First, that the carriage of the troops in this division should be drawn into the stations, both for security, and to enable the troops to move at the shortest notice; and that the European troops in the hills should be held in readiness to march; to move them is a work of time, and needs some preparation. I shall write to the Sub-Commissioner and the other local authorities without delay to collect coolies;

coolies; but I shall be glad to hear from your Excellency the numbers required, and also on what roads supplies, &c. should be got ready.

With respect to further measures, I must of course speak with extreme diffidence; on the whole, I incline still to hold the opinions that I had the honour of expressing verbally; and I may now add, that the matter seems to have come to a pitch which makes some notice of it by our Government not easily avoidable; and this being the case, and as the Governor-general is so near, it may be desirable to await his arrival, or his decision as to the extent of what may be done, before making any movements, unless we hear of the Sikh army having actually crossed the Sutlej.

In all this, however, I speak with the utmost submission to your Excellency's better judgment; but I beg to add, that in whatever your Excellency may decide on, I shall esteem it an honour to give whatever aid I can.

I have, &c.

(signed) *G. Broadfoot.*

Enclosure No. 3 in No. 9.

The AGENT to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRETARY to the Government of India.—Camp, Umballa, 20 November 1845.

(Extract.)

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-general, a copy of a demi-official letter to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, as affairs at Lahore assumed their present form.

Not to delay the messenger, I must reserve a fuller report till to-morrow; but I may add to what has been already communicated demi-officially, and what will be gathered from my letters, that no complaint of any kind has been made to me by the Durbar, and that the pretext of a grievance alleged has been dropped by the Durbar, and rejected by the troops. The truth is, all are in a false position, from the unlooked-for results of the cry raised against the English, to serve a party purpose, and all, moreover, are indifferent to war with us, from their firm persuasion that, if victorious, they will find new means of power and wealth, and, if beaten, that they will be what most of them desire, the heads of a subsidiary, instead of an independent, state.

This opinion has never received any countenance from me, but the very contrary; and the Durbar will by this time have received the perwannah which I addressed to the Vakeel, when the intrigues which have led to the present state of things assumed a serious form. It will be seen from the enclosed copy of it, that no warning could be plainer, and, as therein indicated, that it is only a repetition of former warning.

Continued letters from my assistants, respecting the rumours on the frontier, showed that our posts there were vigilant; and I abstained, therefore, from communicating with the military authorities, in order to prevent the Durbar having the smallest ground to say that any menacing preparations or movements on our part had been taken up, for this ground has been already alleged in their consultations, as justifying their present movements; nay, even after I had yesterday received a communication on the subject from the Major-general commanding the division, I forebore to write to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and even to-day I ventured to recommend to his Excellency that no steps should be taken for the present. Since then, however, authentic intelligence has reached me that the Durbar has openly adopted, and ordered in writing, a fixed plan of operations against the English, and I accordingly addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief the letter, of which a copy is annexed.

I now only suggest abstinence from movement on account of the vicinity of the Governor-general, who will probably think the matter now one which has gone too far to be left unnoticed, whether the troops actually move from Lahore or not.

That I presumed to suggest any delay whatever is owing to this: It appears to me that the frontier is too long to be defensible in all points by any force we can move; that our two posts on the frontier are strong enough to maintain themselves

themselves till relieved; and that to attempt reinforcements, therefore, in anticipation of those of the Sikhs would be useless as protecting the open country, and might impede any operations which the Governor-general may resolve on. Moreover, the delay recommended is only one of two or three days, till an answer to this letter can be received.

The Sikh Sirdars on this side of the Sutlej have for many months past been called on to keep their troops in readiness to repel the invasion of their territories, and I have now directed them to prepare to repel the threatening aggression.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Broadfoot.*

P.S.—It is right to add, that up to the last moment the regular troops were discussing the propriety of murdering Rajah Lal Singh and Sirdar Tej Singh, and sending for Rajah Golab Singh to lead them. The two chiefs menaced look for escape to exciting enthusiasm against the English. This may delay or precipitate invasion.

Enclosure No. 4 in No. 9.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF to the AGENT to the GOVERNOR GENERAL.

SIR,

Camp, Umballa, 20 November 1845.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, this moment, of your letter of this date, conveying to me intelligence of the hostile attitude which has been assumed by the Lahore Durbar.

Under the circumstances, I have ordered the following preparations to be entered upon immediately, to meet whatever may take place:

Her Majesty's 9th Lancers to move at once from Meerut to Umballa.

To be held in readiness to move from Meerut to Kurnal on the shortest notice,—two troops of Horse Artillery; Her Majesty's 16th Lancers; the 3d regiment of Light Cavalry; Her Majesty's 10th Foot, save one company; the corps of Sappers and Miners; all save one of the regiments of Native Infantry.

The 8th regiment of Irregular Cavalry will likewise be held prepared to move from Hansee to Kurnal, and the Simoor Battalion from Deyrah to Saharunpore, where it will be centrally situated, and ready to be moved wherever it may most be required; the 4th regiment of Irregular Cavalry will be brought up from Bareilly to Meerut.

I beg that you will instruct the civil authorities at Simla to place themselves in communication with the officers commanding European corps in those hills, and ascertain from them what number of coolies will be required to enable the regiments to move, in order that they may be collected at once. Supplies for the corps in the hills will be required to be laid in on the roads leading thence to Sirhind.

I shall direct the other corps of all arms in this division to draw their carriage into cantonments, in view to the troops being prepared to act on the shortest notice.

Previous to adopting any further measures at present I would await a communication of the views of the Governor-general.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Gough.*

Enclosure No. 5, in No. 9.

The AGENT to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRETARY to Government.

Umballa, 21 November 1845.

THE Durbar of the forenoon of the 18th was protracted till 2 o'clock, but I have not the details of the afternoon Durbar.

11 A.M. was the hour found by the astrologers as auspicious for the march of the troops; not a chief stirred from his house. The officers and punchayets of the

the troops, regular and irregular, to the number of a couple of thousand, crowded to the Durbar and demanded the reason; the Raneer tried to soothe them, saying, that the fortunate hour being passed, the march could not now be undertaken till the astrologers found another. The crowd demanded that this should be instantly done, and the court astrologer was ordered into their presence to find the proper time. He pored through his tables for two or three hours, while the Raneer sought to divert the attention of the military mob; at length he announced that the most favourable day was not till the 15th Muisur (28th November). The military were furious, and declared that he was an impostor, and that they had to get from him two crores of rupees which he had made from the public money; the pundit implored mercy, and said the 7th Muisur (20th) was also a good day; the military were still angry, and the poor pundit left amidst their menaces.

They proposed that the Raneer and her son should march, and intimated that till they made an example of some chief no march would take place.

The Raneer complained that whilst the troops were urging the march, they were still going home to their villages as fast as they got their pay; and Surdar Sham Singh Attareewallah declared his belief that unless something was done to stop this, he would find himself on his way to Ferozepore with empty tents. The bait of money to be paid, and to accompany them, was also offered, and at length the Durbar broke up at 2 p.m. Great consultations took place in the afternoon, but I know only one result, that the Raneer had to give her lover his formal dismissal, and that he (Rajah Lal Singh) actually went into the camp of the Sawars he is to command, and pitched his tent.

What the Raneer says is quite true of the sepoy dispersing to their houses; the whole affair has so suddenly reached its present height, that many of the men themselves think it will come to nothing, and still more who had taken their departure do not believe it serious enough to go back. On the day after this scene took place, i.e. the 19th, the usual stream of sepoys, natives of the protected states, who had got their pay, poured across the Sutlege, at Hureeskee, on the way to their homes. Every preparation, however, for war is making with probably more energy than if it had been a long-planned scheme, for every person of whatever party must show his sincerity by activity and virulent professions of hatred to the English.

Enclosure No. 6, in No. 9.

LETTER from *Lahore*, Evening of the 24th November 1845.

BHAAE RAM SING thus advised Raja Lal Sing:—"The English have interfered in no affairs of the Khalsa; what is the wisdom of your making a (religious) war at the bidding of the soldiery? None of the nobles have discovered the real intentions of the English. The Governor-general's agent, who is a steady friend, and charged with the relations of the friendship between the two Governments, has written in the plainest terms, that the English Government desires only friendship like that of the late Maharaja Runjeet Sing; but that if any thing wrong is done by the Sikh army, the rulers of the kingdom will be held responsible, for rulers must account for the acts of their troops and subjects. Be cautious how you march to Hureeskee with the troops."

The Raja said, "Bhaee Sahib, what can I do? if I remain, the soldiery calls me to account" (seize me by the throat). The Bhaee said, "Delay a few days; require the other Sardars to go forward, or you will bring the whole odium and risk on yourself; and if you go to Hureeskee, what will you do? If the English do not attack you, you will sit there and be ruined; who will protect you?"

The Raja said he would go to that Dheora, and stay in his tent (near Shalimar), and he begged the Bhaee's influence to have his departure delayed.

The Raja went to his tent, and told the officers of the cavalry to march, as he was ready. They, that is Dal Sing, of Rythub, said, "Raja, you have never seen war of any kind, and know nothing of war with the English; send on the regular troops; we will join rapidly when the war begins. Tej Sing is a wise man; let him go first."

The Raja is greatly ashamed, and sent word to the Bhaee to say he would remain and send on ammunition.

— No. 10. —

The GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Camp, Umballa,
December 4, 1845.—(No. 16).

(Extract.)

MAJOR BROADFOOT having reported to me that the Lahore Vakeel had joined the camp from Looddeana, I directed Major Broadfoot to see him and to require from him the reply to his perwanah, remonstrating against the proceedings which had taken place at the time it was written, and demanding the cause thereof.

The Vakeel waited upon Major Broadfoot, and in reply to his requisition asserted, that he had received no reply from the Durbar; that he had sent the communication immediately to Lahore, had received merely an acknowledgment of its safe arrival, and that he had repeatedly sent urging that a reply should be forwarded to him, but hitherto without success; but he asserted that he fully expected the reply by that evening's post.

Major Broadfoot explicitly informed the Vakeel, as previously instructed by me, that the Governor-general would not permit the Lahore Government to trifle with him in a matter of such serious importance; that positive information had been received of the Lahore army having left the capital towards the frontier, avowedly with hostile intentions towards the British Government, to which course they had been instigated by the express and repeated orders of the Ranee and the chiefs, and that the Governor-general expected to receive, without further delay, an answer to the political agent's written remonstrance. Major Broadfoot then said, that he should report to the Governor-general the result of his interview with the Vakeel, and communicate in writing the orders he might receive. The Vakeel said very little at this interview; he protested that he had done all in his power to procure a reply to the perwannah; and on Major Broadfoot's saying that we knew positively that the Ranee and chiefs had ordered the present movement, he said *he* had no such knowledge.

When Major Broadfoot reported to me, in the evening, the result of this interview, I immediately directed him to address to the Vakeel the written communication, a copy of which is inclosed.

I considered that it was absolutely necessary, on my arrival at Umballa, to take decided notice of the extraordinary proceedings that had taken place, and were stated to be still in progress. It was evident I could not permit the political agent's communications, in the face of what was going on at Lahore, to be treated with disregard. I took the mildest course in my power, consistently with the dignity, position and interests of the British Government. I purposely left an opening to the Lahore Government to remedy, through its Vakeel, the discourtesy it had shown, by affording to that Government the facility of making any explanation it might desire. The plain construction to be put on the silence of the Lahore Government in reply to the demand for explanation, evidently was, that the intentions of that Government were hostile, in which case I did not deem it to be expedient to give to that Government the leisure to complete their hostile preparations; whilst, on my part, I had abstained from making any movement, expressly for the purpose of avoiding any cause of jealousy or alarm; thus affording to the Maharaja's Government the strongest proof of the good faith and forbearance of the British Government.

Major Broadfoot entertains the impression that the reply to his demands had been sent to the Vakeel, and had either been returned by him, with a protest, (as is, I understand, often done), or was, at the moment of the conference in his possession, but was withheld because the Vakeel was reluctant to deliver so unfriendly a document.

However that may be, the perwannah from Major Broadfoot of the evening of the 2d December was received by the Vakeel the same night, and, with the reception of an acknowledgment of its receipt, no further communication has passed between him and Major Broadfoot. The Vakeel is not now in the camp.

I am satisfied that the course I have adopted was imperatively required, and before I authorize any precautionary movements to be made, I shall give full time for a reply to be received from Lahore.

This morning, news up to the 1st instant has been received. The Ranee and Sirdars are becoming more and more urgent that the army should advance to the frontier,

frontier, believing that, in the present posture of affairs, the only hope of saving their lives and prolonging their power is to be found in bringing about collision with the British forces. The Sikh army moves with evident reluctance, and is calling for Golab Sing, who is collecting forces at Jumboo, and is watching the progress of events.

My own impression remains unaltered. I do not expect that the troops will come as far as the banks of the Sutlej, or that any positive act of aggression will be committed; but it is evident that the Ranee and chiefs are, for their own preservation, endeavouring to raise a storm, which, when raised, they will be powerless either to direct or allay.

I shall, as I have before said, await the reply from Lahore to Major Broadfoot's last communication to the Vakeel.

If the reply from the ostensible Government, acting under the control and at the dictation of the army, is hostile, I shall at once order up troops from Meerut and other stations to the support of our advanced positions, persevering up to the last moment in the sincere desire to avoid hostilities.

Enclosure No. 1, in No. 10.

The AGENT to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the LAHORE VAKEEL.

2 December 1845.

I WROTE to you a letter on the 18th ultimo, requiring explanations as to the reported orders of the Lahore Durbar to its troops, to move towards the Sutlej with unfriendly intentions.

On the 20th instant, you answered from Loodeeana, that you had forwarded a copy of my letter to the Durbar immediately on receiving it, and you stated that on receiving an answer you would forthwith communicate it.

For several days past I have been in hourly expectation of your answer, but none came.

This day, on your waiting on me, you informed me, that though you had some days ago received from the Durbar an acknowledgment of the receipt of your letter, you had received no answer to it, but that you had in the interval written repeatedly to the Durbar on the subject of it, and that you confidently expected an answer this day, or, at furthest, to-morrow morning.

I pointed out to you that, notwithstanding the notoriety of the events which had occurred at Lahore, and notwithstanding the inconvenience suffered by the detention, on the frontier, of the battalions about to leave it for Sind and Bareilly, the Governor-general, in hopes of receiving without delay satisfactory explanations in answer to my letter, had continued the forbearance he has exercised so long, and to so great an extent; that no new troops had arrived on the frontier, and that the Governor-general had proceeded slowly on his journey in this direction, as intended, before the occurrence of the events of which explanation is now demanded; that I pointed out that, notwithstanding this forbearance, you had appeared after so long an interval, without any answer to my demand for an explanation, and that I saw this with surprise and regret.

I have now to communicate to you the following orders from the Governor-general:

His Excellency has directed me to say, that the rules of friendship between the two States, and indeed the customs of all nations, require that in answering a demand for explanations of events so grave as those which have occurred at Lahore, not a moment is to be lost, because delay cannot but operate to confirm the (MOST UNFRIENDLY) *worst* construction of such events, and is, moreover, an act of the highest discourtesy towards the Government demanding explanations. In this instance the requisition for explanation has been disregarded, and the apparently hostile movements have been continued.

Under these circumstances, the Governor-general feels it impossible to permit you, who are the authorized representative of the Government which has offered to his Government so great a slight, to continue in his Excellency's camp, while this slight is persevered in; he has directed me not to admit you to any further interview with me, unless you come as the bearer of the answer of the Durbar

to my remonstrance; and his Excellency further commands, that if this answer be not delivered before noon to-morrow, you will quit this camp.

To prevent, however, interruption to the business of this agency, as regards the Mahaja's estates on this side of the Sutlej, I request that you will leave with me a confidential Moonshee to communicate, during your absence, my orders, or those of the subordinate courts of the agency, to the managers of those estates; and you will warn the Kardars and residents in those estates to obey all orders coming from the ordinary courts through your Moonshee in the same way as if received from yourself.

(signed) *G. Broadfoot.*

Enclosure No. 2, in No. 10.

THE LAHORE VAKEEL to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S AGENT.

YOUR letter, dated 2d December 1845, has been delivered to me by Moulvee Rujub Ally Khan after midnight, and I have arranged for its immediate transmission to the Durbar.



Seal of *Krishen Chund.*

The 2d December 1845, after midnight, (*i. e.*, by our reckoning, 1 A. M., 3d.)

— No. 11. —

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL to the SECRET COMMITTEE.—Camp, Ferozepore,
31 December 1845.—(No. 18.)

(Extract.)

SINCE my last Despatch to you, of the 4th instant, events of great moment have occurred.

The Sikh army in large numbers commenced crossing the Sutlege on the 11th, and, after investing Ferozepore on one side, took up an entrenched position at the village of Ferozeshab, about 10 miles in advance of Ferozepore, and about the same distance from the village of Moodhee.

In this camp the enemy had placed 108 pieces of cannon, some of large calibre, with a force exceeding 50,000 men, for the purpose of intercepting the approach of the British force, moving up from Umballa, to the relief of Ferozepore, which had been thus treacherously attacked, without provocation or declaration of hostilities.

I had ordered on the 8th instant that portion of our army, posted at Umballah for defensive purposes, to move up on the 11th, and after a rapid march of 150 miles it reached Moodkee on the 18th, where, on the evening of the same day, it repulsed an attack of the Sikh army, and captured 17 guns; on the following day the army was concentrated at Moodkee, and on the 21st moved by its left on Ferozepore, and having on the march formed its junction at half-past one o'clock with 5,000 men and 21 guns, under Major-general Sir John Littler, which had moved from Ferozepore that morning, the Commander-in-Chief formed the army in order of battle, and attacked the enemy's entrenched camp; and on that evening and the following morning captured 70 pieces of artillery, taking possession of the enemy's camp, with large quantities of ammunition and warlike stores.

These successful and energetic operations have been followed by the retreat of the Sikh army to the other side of the Sutlege, the British army being now encamped between Ferozepore and the fords of the Sutlege.

You will not fail to observe that these important and brilliant successes have been achieved by that portion of our army posted at and in advance of Umballah, for defensive purposes; and that our forces from Meerut, and other stations from the

the rear, ordered to move up at the same time, are in reserve, and will reach this neighbourhood between the 5th and the 9th of January.

I have the honour to enclose two reports from the Commander-in-Chief, detailing the admirable manner in which these important duties have been performed, and I am convinced the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in concurrence with Her Majesty's Government, will highly appreciate the eminent services rendered by the Commander-in-Chief, and by the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Indian army.

The Commander-in-Chief has successfully accomplished every object I had directed him to effect for the relief of Ferozepore, and the protection of these British states. No accident or failure has occurred during the complicated operations of a combined movement, and our army, whether for defence or attack, has shown, as heretofore, that its power is irresistible.

I also transmit a notification which I issued on the 25th instant, and a general order recording the grateful acknowledgments of the Indian Government for these important services.

I now proceed to detail the events which preceded a resort to arms, and I am convinced that the forbearance manifested by me in all these transactions will meet with your approval.

My previous correspondence will show the extreme anxiety I felt to avoid hostilities, by friendly explanations required from the Lahore Durbar; and my reluctance to give any cause for jealousy or alarm to the Sikh army and government was so strong, that, from the 18th of November up to the 8th of December, I deferred to make any movement of troops, in the hope of proving the sincerity of our professions by the moderation of our actions. This forbearance, carried to the utmost limits which prudence could allow, was not appreciated at Lahore.

In the state of anarchy and uncontrollable power usurped by the Sikh army, my reluctance to resent their hostile conduct may have been misunderstood as the effect of conscious weakness or of timidity; but the Lahore government, there is every reason to believe, was not influenced by any such impressions.

The regent and her advisers courted collision for the purpose of employing their unruly soldiers against their friendly neighbour, as the safest means of extricating themselves from the personal dangers to which they were constantly exposed; the Lahore government deceived their army by false statements of the fidelity of our native troops, whom they have in vain attempted to corrupt by emissaries employed by that government.

And there is also reason to believe that active intrigues had for some time past been resorted to, in order to induce the chiefs of our protected Sikh territories to rise in arms against the British power, as soon as a Sikh army should cross the Sutleje.

There was no proof that such a conspiracy existed on the part of the leading Sikh chiefs on this side the Sutleje, although in a very few instances, where the personal character of the individuals accounted for the folly of their conduct, there were reasons for believing that disaffection did exist, and would be exhibited with activity on the first favourable opportunity, and particularly if any reverse should attend our arms.

I shall have occasion to advert to this subject when I notice the proclamation I issued on the 13th instant.

But I will previously resume the narrative of the daily intelligence from Lahore, as affording a connected series of the events which have occurred, since the 4th of December, when I informed you that I had deemed it expedient to desire the Lahore Vakeel to leave my camp, in consequence of the disregard shown by his court to my political agent's remonstrance of the 18th of November, and of the determination evinced by the Durbar to withhold all explanation of their conduct.

I had moved with my camp on the 6th of December from Umballa towards Loodiana, peaceably making my progress by the route I had announced, with the intention of visiting the Sikh protected states, according to the usual custom of my predecessors.

In common with the most experienced officers of the Indian government, I was not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutleje with its infantry and artillery.

I considered it probable that some act of aggression would be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to

interfere, to which course the Sikh chiefs knew I was most averse, but I concurred with the Commander-in-Chief, and the chief secretary to the government, as well as with my political agent, Major Broadfoot, that offensive operations, on a large scale, would not be resorted to.

Exclusive of the political reasons which induced me to carry my forbearance, as far as it was possible, I was confident, from the opinions given by the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Sir John Littler, in command of the forces at Ferozepore, that that post would resist any attack from the Sikh army as long as its provisions lasted; and that I could at any time relieve it, under the ordinary circumstances of an Asiatic army making an irruption into our territories, provided it had not the means of laying siege to the fort and the entrenched camp.

Up to this period no act of aggression had been committed by the Sikh army. The Lahore Government had as good a right to reinforce their bank of the river Sutledge, as we had to reinforce our posts on that river.

The Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river from Lahore, and, after remaining there encamped a few weeks, had returned to the capital. These reasons, and above all my extreme anxiety to avoid hostilities, induced me not to make any hasty movement with our army, which when the two armies came into each others presence, might bring about a collision.

The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and, on the 7th and 8th December, when I heard from Lahore that preparations were making on a large scale for artillery, stores and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, directing his Excellency, on the 11th, to move up the force from Umballa, from Meerut, and some other stations in the rear.

Up to this time no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutledge. Nevertheless, I considered it prudent no longer to delay the forward movement of our troops, having given to the Lahore Government the most ample time for a reply to our remonstrance.

On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicolson, the assistant political agent at Ferozepore, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the other hand, the information received by Major Broadfoot on that day from Lahore was not of a character to make it probable that any Sikh movement on a large scale was meditated.

On the 10th no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicolson's report, and the usual opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutledge.

The troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th and 12th, in pursuance of the orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces, destined to move up to the Sutledge, were in full march on the 12th.

I did not consider the force, moving up from Umballa, to be sufficient to force its way to relieve Ferozepore, if a large Sikh army, with a numerous and well served park of artillery, should attempt to intercept it in its approach to Ferozepore, as, in such case, it could with difficulty receive any aid from that garrison. Being some days march in advance of the Commander-in-Chief, I rode over to Loodiana; and, having inspected the fort, the cantonments and the troops, it appeared to me most advisable that the whole of this force should be moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Loodiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the more infirm soldiers of the regiments at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency.

The risk to be incurred of leaving the town and the cantonments liable to be plundered, was maturely considered, and I had no hesitation in incurring that risk to ensure the strength and sufficiency of the force which might separately be brought into action with the whole of the Sikh army. I, therefore, ordered Brigadier Wheeler to be prepared to march at the shortest notice.

The Umballa force, in March, was 7,500 men and 36 guns.

The Loodiana force amounted to 5,000 men and 12 guns.

The Commander-in-Chief concurred in these views; and this fine body of men, by a rapid march on Busseean, an important point, where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been laid in at Busseean.

Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied; but, by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs

appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river.

On the 13th I first received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutledge, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river.

The Umballah force at that time had been in movement three days. On this date I issued the proclamation, a copy of which is enclosed.

On the 14th the British forces moved up by double marches on alternate days, and on the 18th reached Moodkee, 20 miles from Ferozepoor, after a march of 21 miles.

On this day, and at this place, the whole British force was concentrated, with the exception of two European and two native regiments, expected on the following day.

The troops were engaged in cooking their meals, when Major Broadfoot received information that the Sikh army was in full march, with the intention to surprise the camp. The troops immediately stood to their arms, and advanced. The result of that short, but decisive, action, was the signal defeat of the enemy at every point, and the capture of 17 guns, the details of which are given in the report of the Commander-in-Chief, herewith sent. The troops returned to their camp at midnight, and halted the 19th and 20th to refresh the men, to collect the wounded, and bring in the captured guns.

There was no objection to this delay, as it was evident, from the preparations and movements of the Sikh army, that its commander was intent upon intercepting the relieving force, and had no intention of risking an attack against Ferozepoor.

On the 21st the Commander-in-Chief, having left the baggage of the army, the wounded and the captured guns at Moodkee, protected by two regiments of native infantry, marched at four o'clock in the morning by his left, keeping about three or four miles from the enemy's entrenched position at Ferozeshah, in which the enemy had placed 108 pieces of cannon, protected by breast-works.

A communication had been made during the preceding night with Sir John Littler, informing him of the intended line of march, and desiring him to move out with such a part of his force as would not compromise the safety of his troops and the post.

At half-past one o'clock the Umballah force, having marched across the country disencumbered of every description of baggage, except the reserve ammunition, formed its junction with Sir John Littler's force, who had moved out of Ferozepore with 5,000 men, two regiments of cavalry, and 21 field guns.

This combined operation having been effected, the Commander-in-Chief, with my entire concurrence, made his arrangements for the attack of the enemy's position at Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united.

The British force consisted of 16,700 men, and 69 guns, chiefly horse artillery.

The Sikh forces varied from 48,000 to 60,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries.

You will observe that every soldier who could be brought into our ranks, had, by these combinations from Umballah and Ludiana to Ferozepore, been rendered available; that the force was most efficient, and, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground, intersected with jungle, the vast superiority of the enemy's well-served artillery, and the breast-works behind which their infantry fought, that our British force, particularly our infantry, surmounted every obstacle, capturing that evening and the following morning 70 pieces of artillery, and the whole of the enemy's camp-equipage and military stores.

I refer to the report of the Commander-in-Chief for the details of this brilliant exploit.

The three attempts of the Sikh army, reinforced by Tej Sing's army, to retake their position in the course of the day, were unavailing.

The Sikh army then retreated on the fords of the Sutlege, disheartened by the capture of its artillery, and the severe loss it had sustained in killed and wounded, and has since crossed over to the other side of the river.

The force thus promptly brought forward from Umballah to the frontier, has proved that it was sufficient for the protective object for which it was prepared, to repulse the treachery of the Maharajah's government, and the arrogance of the Sikh army.

It has further proved, that the military precautions taken were most necessary. It has driven the invading force from our territories, and punished the mutinous soldiery of a most unscrupulous government.

It remains for me to advert to the proclamation, a copy of which forms an enclosure of this despatch. I have endeavoured, in that paper, to give a brief outline of our relations with the Lahore State, and of the circumstances which have preceded the present rupture. That this invasion of our territory by the Sikh army was unprovoked, must be apparent to all; and I considered it right that the forbearance I had shown, with the motives of that forbearance, should be distinctly promulgated.

The caution to the protected chiefs was necessary; for, during many months past, though no overt acts of hostility have been committed, with one exception, there was a feeling very generally prevalent among them favourable to the Lahore government rather than to our's, which evinced itself in a backwardness to afford supplies for our army, and to attend to the requisitions of the agency. This, with the exception of the Maharaja of Puteala, was the case with perhaps all the chiefs.

Immediate measures will be taken for bringing into some order and settlement the States which have been declared confiscated on this side of the Sutlej, when it is hoped that the advantages of the British rule may, by light assessment and judicious arrangements, be made apparent to them.

I have now to conclude this Despatch, by expressing my deep concern for the loss, in the action of the 21st instant, of that most invaluable officer, Major Broadfoot, my political agent for these States. He was wounded, and thrown off his horse, at my side, but I failed in prevailing on him to retire. He remounted his horse, and, shortly afterwards, received a mortal wound in leading on the troops against the battery in our front. I entertained the highest opinion of his abilities. He was second to none in this accomplished service, in every qualification by which the political or military interests of the East India Company could be advanced, and I shall be most gratified if, at a season of more leisure, some special mark of honour can be conferred, by which his great merits and glorious death may be perpetuated.

Major George Broadfoot was the last of three brothers, who held appointments in the Company's army, and all these have fallen in battle, in the service of their country.

Captain Nicolson, assistant political agent from Ferozepore, was also killed in the action of the 21st instant, and was a most able and gallant officer.

Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Lake, assistants under Major Broadfoot, were wounded, and have ever since continued their exertions.

Captain Mills, assistant political agent at Loodiana, took the command of a troop of horse artillery during the action, and has subsequently been of the greatest use by his intelligence and activity.

I owe great obligations to the Chief Secretary to the Government of India, Frederick Currie, esq., who has, during all these various, and sometimes conflicting, duties, in which I have been engaged, given me his sound advice and active aid, sometimes accompanying me in the field, and at all times evincing the coolest judgment, and exhibiting the resources of his experience to the great advantage of the Company's service.

Mr. Cust, of the civil service, confidential assistant to Major Broadfoot, both in the field and in his own immediate department, has shown great intelligence in duties which were new to him, and I notice him as a most promising officer.

Enclosure 1 to No. 11.

EXTRACTS from Lahore Letters of the evening of the 6th instant, received during the night of the 8th instant at Rajpooora.

A LETTER arrived from General Lal Singh Murariya, at Jenota, saying, "Sindar Jowahir Sing used to speak to me about attacking the English: my heart's desire is now accomplished; therefore I hope to be sent against Ferozepore, and will bring

bring over the whole army of the English to the Sikh Government, and Ferozepore will be taken without fighting.

The Ranee said, "Every body talks of conquering Ferozepore, but nobody advances."

EXTRACT of another Letter of the same date.

ON Monday, Tej Singh will join the army, but if in the meantime any disturbance occurs, he will not. He to-day asked the Ranee and Sardars, as they were sending him to make war on the English Government, to give him a written order; the Ranee said, "Why do you constantly ask for written orders? The army regular and irregular marched by the Maharaja's order, and now you are going by the same order." The Ranee asked what the army was plotting as to her? Tej Singh said, that this time the army would, undoubtedly, treat her ill; that she had sent them against the English to get them ruined, but that the army had found out this device, and now said they would "comb"* her, along with Rajah Lal Singh, and imprison the Sardars, and deliver them to Rajah Gorlah Singh, who would settle their accounts.

The heart's desire of Rajah Lal Singh is in any way to commit the troops with the English, by getting any portion of them across the Sutlej, and creating disturbance under the English Government, and if he cannot do this, to seek an opportunity of flight across the Sutlej.

Rely on this being correct.

EXTRACT from a Letter received 9th December, dated 5th December 1845, morning, from Lahore.

THE Ranee said, that in spite of orders continued for 20 days, the troops did not match.

Tej Sing said, they had none of their old leaders left; they knew certain death was before them, and therefore would not march; that the Sikh troops were abundantly wise, and would not go on to certain death; they would go to Coss; lacs of rupees would be uselessly spent in military stores, carriage and grain, and nothing be done, while the established friendship between the two great powers was broken up after lasting 40 years; Fukeer Ayeeyoodan, he said, was a wise and fortunate man to have withdrawn from public business two years ago, and devoted himself to meditating on God, and to have now found an honourable death, leaving an unspeakable reputation here, and obtaining besides a place in Heaven. The Ranee then ordered the Fukeer's Jageer to be resumed, but Deena hath begged it might be left with the family till the present crop was reaped, which was granted.

Enclosure 2, in No. 11.

PROCLAMATION by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India.

Camp, Luhkuree Khan Ke Serai, December 13, 1845.

THE British Government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjab.

In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British Government and the late Maharaja Runjeet Singh, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British Government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Maharaja.

The same friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Maharaja Runjeet Singh by the British Government up to the present time.

Since the death of the late Maharaja Shere Sing, the disorganized state of the Lahore Government has made it incumbent on the Governor-general in Council to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier; the nature of these measures, and the cause of their adoption, were, at the time, fully explained to the Lahore Durbar.

Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore Government during the last

* The cant word of the soldiery for murdering.

last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the Durbar, the Governor-general in Council has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two states for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown, on every occasion, the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Maharaja Dulleep Sing, whom the British Government had recognized as the successor to the late Maharaja Shere Sing.

The Governor-general in Council sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh Government re-established in the Punjab, able to control its army and to protect its subjects; he had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the chiefs and people of that country.

The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British frontier, as it was alleged, by the orders of the Durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

The Governor-general's agent, by direction of the Governor-general, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The Governor-general, unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh Government, to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the Government of the Maharaja, or to induce collision between the two states.

When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the Governor-general considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier to reinforce the frontier posts.

The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

The Governor-general must, therefore, take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace.

The Governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Maharaja Dulleep Sing on the left, or British, bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

The Governor-general will respect the existing rights of all Jagheerdars, Zemindars and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British Government.

The Governor-general hereby calls upon all the Chiefs and Sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British Government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these states. Those of the chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British Government, and will be punished accordingly.

The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British Government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

All subjects of the British Government, and those who possess estates on both sides the River Sutlej, who, by their faithful adherence to the British Government, may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

On the other hand, all subjects of the British Government who shall continue in the service of the Lahore state, and who disobey the Proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side the Sutlej confiscated, and themselves declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government.

By order of the Right honourable the Governor-general of India,

F. Currie,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-general.

Enclosure No. 3, in No. 11.

General Sir *Hugh Gough*, Bart., G. C. B., the Commander-in-chief of the Army in India, to the Governor-general.

Right Honourable Sir,

Head Quarters, Army of the Sutlej, Camp,
Moodkee, December 19, 1845.

It would be a superfluous form in me to address to you a narrative of the campaign which has opened against the Sikhs, and the successful action of yesterday, since you have in person shared the fatigues and dangers of our army, and witnessed its efforts and privations, but that my position at its head renders this my duty, and it is necessary, from that position, I should place these events on record, for the information of all Europe as well as of all India.

You, Sir, know, but others have to be told, that the sudden and unprovoked aggression of the Sikhs, by crossing the Sutlej with the great proportion of their army, with the avowed intention of attacking Ferozepore in time of profound peace, rendered indispensable, on our side, a series of difficult combinations for the protection of our frontier station, so unjustifiably and so unexpectedly menaced.

From the advanced and salient situation of Ferozepore, and its vicinity to the Sikh capital, its defence against a sudden attack became a difficult operation. It was always possible for the Sikh Government to throw a formidable force upon it before one sufficiently numerous could on our side be collected to support it: but when, upon the 11th instant, it became known at Umballa, where I had established my head-quarters, that this invasion had actually taken place, the efforts to repel it followed each other in rapid succession;* notwithstanding I had the fullest confidence in Major-general Sir John Littler, commanding at Ferozepore, and in the devotedness and gallantry of the troops occupying it.

The troops from the different stations in the Sirhind division were directed to move by forced marches upon Busseean, where by a most judicious arrangement you had directed supplies to be collected within a wonderfully short space of time.

The main portion of the force at Loodiana was withdrawn, and a garrison thrown into the little fortress there. From this central position, already alluded to, both Loodiana and Ferozepore could be supported, and the safety of both places might be considered to be brought, in some measure, within the scope of the contingencies of a general action to be fought for their relief.

All this is soon related; but most harassing have been the marches of the troops in completing this concentration. When their march had been further prolonged to this place, they had moved over a distance of upwards of 150 miles in six days, along roads of heavy sand; their perpetual labour allowing them scarcely time to cook their food, even when they received it, and hardly an hour for repose, before they were called upon for renewed exertions.

When our leading corps reached Wudnee, a small jaghire of the late Maharajah Shere Singh, its garrison shut the gates of the fort against them; and, as our battering guns were far in the rear, it was determined to reserve it for future chastisement, and we remained content with compelling the village to furnish supplies (it could, however, provide little, except for our overworked cattle), under pain of enduring a cannonade and assault; this it did, without the necessity of firing a shot.

When we reached Wudnee, it was evident that the force before Ferozepore felt the influence of our movements, as we heard that a very large portion of that force had been detached to oppose our further advance; their feeling parties retired on the morning of the 18th before our cavalry piquets, near the village and fort of Moodkee.

Soon after mid-day, the division under Major-general Sir Harry Smith, a brigade of that under Major-general Sir John M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-general Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery, and two light field batteries under Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, of the horse artillery (Brigadier in command of the artillery force), and the cavalry division, consisting of Her

Majesty's

* Sic in orig.

Majesty's 3d light dragoons, the body guard, 4th and 5th light cavalry, and 9th irregular cavalry, took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee.

The troops were in a state of great exhaustion, principally from the want of water, which was not procurable on the road, when, about three P.M., information was received that the Sikh army was advancing; and the troops had scarcely time to get under arms, and move to their positions, when the fact was ascertained.

I immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and 40 guns; they evidently had either just taken up this position, or were advancing in order of battle against us.

To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry under Brigadiers White, Gough and Mactier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flanks.

The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but, in some places, thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded; and, whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigades into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3d light dragoons, with the 2d brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right. This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert and Sir John McCaskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had every thing at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced; and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army, that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry, using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.

I regret to say, this gallant and successful attack was attended with considerable loss; the force bivouacked upon the field for some hours, and only returned to its encampment after ascertaining that it had no enemy before it, and that night prevented the possibility of a regular advance in pursuit.

I beg to congratulate you, Right Honourable Sir, on this first defeat of our invaders by the army I have the honour to command. The perseverance by which success was attained you personally witnessed; and the troops I am sure felt proud of the self-devotion with which their Governor-general exposed himself to every danger amongst them. I before said that our loss has been severe; it could

not be esteemed small if we had no other to record, when I mention that, towards the conclusion of the affair, Major-general Sir Robert Sale, to whom India and England are so much indebted, had his left thigh shattered by a grape shot, and that the wound has since proved mortal. Sir John M'Caskill, an old and valued officer, who has done his country much good service, received a ball through his chest, on the advance of his division, and immediately expired. Brigadiers Bolton and Mactier, and Lieutenant-colonels Bunbury and Byrne, and other valuable officers, are amongst the wounded. These losses our country and the service will deplore, but not consider unavailing, when Ferozepore shall be rescued from the invader, and the insult to our territory and rule fitly punished.

I have every reason to be proud of, and gratified with, the exertions of the whole of the officers and troops of this army on this arduous occasion; with the conduct and dispositions of the generals of divisions, the brigadiers of the several arms, the general, personal, divisional and brigade staff, and the commanding officers of regiments; but this dispatch is necessarily completed in the utmost haste, and in the midst of most important operations; I must, therefore, reserve to a future opportunity the pleasing task of bringing especially and by name to the notice of Government the particular merits of individual officers.

I cannot, however, refrain from expressing my deep sense of obligation to the heads of the two principal departments. Major-general Sir James Lumley was unfortunately prevented by severe sickness from taking part in the active duties of this great crisis; Major Grant, Deputy Adjutant General, therefore, supplied his place, and it is my duty to say how ably this has been done, and how great a loss I have endured by being deprived, for the present, of his services, in consequence of two wounds which he received whilst urging on the infantry to the final and decisive attack of the enemy's batteries. Neither must I fail to record the valuable aid which has upon this, as on a former campaign, been afforded me by the Quartermaster General, Lieutenant-Colonel Garden; his departmental arrangements demand my highest commendation. Major-General Sir Harry Smith having been appointed to the command of a division, the charge of his office as Adjutant General of Her Majesty's Forces devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Barr, who, not only in the performance of these duties, but in every way in which assistance can be rendered in active operations, has been to me a most valuable Staff Officer.

I have to thank you, Right Honourable Sir, for having placed at my disposal the services of the officers of your staff, and to thank them for the valuable assistance they afforded me on this arduous day. It shall be my pleasing duty to mention them individually, with the officers of my own personal staff, in the recommendation list I shall have the honour of forwarding, at an early date, to Government.

I have, &c.

H. Gough,
General, Commander-in-Chief.

RETURN of KILLED and WOUNDED of the Army of the Sutlej under the command of his Excellency General Sir *Hugh Gough*, G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief, in the action fought at *Moodkee*, on the 18th of December 1845.

Camp, Sultan Khan Wallah, 26 December 1845.

Personal Staff.—2 officers killed; 2 officers wounded.

General Staff.—1 officer killed; 1 officer wounded.

Total.—3 officers killed; 3 officers wounded.

ARTILLERY DIVISION.

1st Brigade of Horse Artillery.—1 officer, 1 serjeant, 7 rank and file, 24 horses, killed; 3 officers, 2 serjeants, 10 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce, 18 horses, wounded.

Detachment 3d Brigade Horse Artillery.—2 serjeants, 4 rank and file, 5 syces and grasscutters, 12 horses, killed; 1 officer, 1 native officer, 9 rank and file, 9 lascars, 6 syces, 2 horses, wounded.

3d Company 4th Battalion and No. 7 Light Field Battery.—1 officer, 1 serjeant, 1 syce driver, 4 horses, killed; 2 horses wounded.

2d Company 6th Battalion and No. 9 Light Field Battery.—2 rank and file, 2 syce drivers, 5 horses, killed; 3 rank and file, 2 syce drivers, 3 horses wounded.

Total.—2 officers, 4 serjeants, 13 rank and file, 5 syces and grasscutter, 3 syce drivers, 45 horses, killed; 4 officers, 1 native officer, 2 serjeants, 22 rank and file, 11 lascars, 2 syce drivers, 7 syces, 25 horses, wounded.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—2 officers wounded.

Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons—2 officers, 5 sergeants, 1 trumpeter, 52 rank and file, 104 horses, killed; 3 officers, 3 sergeants, 29 rank and file, 23 horses, wounded.

Governor-General's Body-guard—1 officer, 6 rank and file, 15 horses, killed; 2 officers 2 sergeants, 15 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded.

4th Regiment Light Cavalry (Lancers)—2 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 4 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—8 rank and file, 22 horses, killed; 2 officers, 1 native officer, 1 trumpeter, 15 rank and file, 15 horses, wounded.

9th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 22 horses, killed; 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, 9 horses wounded.

Total—3 officers, 6 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 71 rank and file, 164 horses, killed; 9 officers, 1 native officer, 6 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 70 rank and file, 63 horses, wounded.

1st INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—1 officer killed; 4 officers, 1 horse, wounded.

1st Brigade.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—1 officer, 2 sergeants, 22 rank and file, killed; 7 officers, 4 sergeants, 121 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

47th Regiment Native Infantry—6 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 8 rank and file, wounded.

2d Brigade.

Her Majesty's 50th Foot—1 officer, 11 rank and file, killed; 5 officers, 5 sergeants, 87 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

42d Regiment Native Light Infantry—1 officer, 1 havildar, 25 rank and file, killed; 6 officers, 1 native officer, 5 havildars, 55 rank and file, wounded.

48th Regiment Native Light Infantry—1 native officer, 1 havildar, 5 rank and file, killed; 1 native officer, 6 havildars, 28 rank and file, wounded.

Total—4 officers, 1 native officer, 4 sergeants or havildars, 69 rank and file, killed; 18 officers, 2 native officers, 20 sergeants or havildars, 299 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded.

2d INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—1 horse killed; 1 officer wounded.

3d Brigade.

45th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

2d Regiment Native Grenadiers—14 rank and file killed; 3 officers, 3 native officers, 3 havildars, 48 rank and file, wounded.

4th Brigade.

16th Regiment Native Grenadiers—1 native officer, 2 rank and file, killed; 2 native officers, 7 havildars, 32 rank and file, wounded.

Total—1 native officer, 17 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 4 officers, 5 native officers, 10 havildars, 81 syces, wounded.

3d INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—1 officer killed.

5th Brigade.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—2 rank and file, killed; 1 officer, 2 sergeants, 47 rank and file, wounded.

26th Native Light Infantry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, wounded.

73d Native Light Infantry—1 rank and file, killed; 1 havildar, 5 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

6th Brigade.

Her Majesty's 80th Foot—1 sergeant, 3 rank and file, killed; 1 officer, 19 rank and file, wounded.

Total—1 officer, 1 sergeant, 6 rank and file, killed; 2 officers, 4 havildars, 73 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

ABSTRACT.

Personal Staff—2 officers killed; 2 officers wounded.

General Staff—1 officer killed; 1 officer wounded.

Artillery Division—2 officers, 4 sergeants, 13 rank and file, 5 syces and grasscutters, 3 sycce drivers, 45 horses, killed; 4 officers, 1 native officer, 2 sergeants, 22 syces and grasscutters, 11 lascars, 2 sycce drivers, 7 syces, 25 horses, wounded.

Cavalry Division—3 officers, 6 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 71 rank and file, 164 horses, killed; 9 officers, 1 native officer, 6 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 70 rank and file, 63 horses, wounded.

1st Infantry Division—4 officers, 1 native officer, 4 sergeants or havildars, 69 rank and file,

file, killed; 18 officers, 2 native officers, 20 serjeants or havildars, 299 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded.

2d Infantry Division—1 native officer, 17 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 4 officers, 5 native officers, 10 serjeants or havildars, 81 rank and file, wounded.

3d Infantry Division—1 officer, 1 serjeant or havildar, 6 rank and file, killed; 1 officer, 4 serjeants or havildars, 73 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

TOTAL—13 officers, 2 native officers, 15 serjeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 176 rank and file, 5 syces and grasscutters, 3 syce drivers, 210 horses, killed; 39 officers, 9 native officers, 42 serjeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 545 rank and file, 12 lascars, 2 syce drivers, 7 syces, 92 horses, wounded.

European officers, 13; native officers, 2; non-commissioned officers, drummers, rank and file, 192; syces, &c., 8; killed.

GRAND TOTAL, 215.

European officers, 39; native officers, 9; non-commissioned officers, drummers, rank and file, 588, syces, &c., 21; wounded.

GRAND TOTAL, 657.

Grand total of all ranks, killed and wounded, 872.

LIST OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Head Quarters' Staff—Major General Sir R. H. Sale, G.C.B. Quartermaster-General Queen's troops, killed; Major W. R. Herries, A.D.C. to the Governor-General, killed; Captain J. Munro, killed. Major P. Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General of the army, dangerously wounded; Captain G. E. Hillier, A.D.C. to the Governor-General, severely wounded; Captain H. B. Edwardes, A.D.C. to the Commander-in-Chief, slightly wounded.

Artillery Division—Captain Jasper Trower, killed; First Lieutenant R. Pollock, killed. Captain F. Dashwood, severely wounded, since dead; First Lieutenant C. V. Cox, slightly wounded; First Lieutenant C. A. Wheelwright, wounded; First Lieutenant C. Bowie, slightly wounded.

Cavalry Division Staff—Brigadier W. Mactier, severely; Brevet Captain and Brigade Major T. L. Harrington, severely; Volunteer Mr. A. Alexander, A.D.C. to Brigadier Gough, severely.

Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons—Brevet Captain G. Newton, killed; Cornet E. Worley, killed. Lieutenant S. Fisher, severely wounded; Lieutenant E. G. Swinton, severely wounded; Lieutenant E. B. Cureton, severely wounded.

Governor-General's Body Guard—Lieutenant W. Fisher, killed. Brevet Captain C. D. Dawkins, severely wounded; Lieutenant G. R. Taylor, very severely wounded.

5th Light Cavalry—Major Alexander, slightly; Lieutenant R. Christie, slightly.

First Division of Infantry.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—Captain Van Homrigh, 48th Native Infantry, Acting A.D.C., killed. Brigadier S. Bolton, C.B., dangerously wounded; Brigadier H. M. Wheeler, C.B., severely wounded; Captain E. Lugard, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, slightly wounded; Lieutenant Nicolls, Engineers, Acting A.D.C., severely wounded.

First Brigade.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—Lieutenant H. W. Hart, killed. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Byrne, severely wounded; Captain W. Willes, dangerously wounded; Captain T. Bulkeley, dangerously wounded; Captain G. D. Young, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant J. L. R. Pollard, slightly wounded; Lieutenant J. Brechley, mortally wounded, since dead; Assistant Surgeon R. B. Gahan, 9th Foot, dangerously wounded.

47th Native Infantry—1 wounded; Lieutenant J. F. Pogson, dangerously.

Second Brigade.

Her Majesty's 50th Foot—Assistant Surgeon A. Graydon, killed. Captain H. Needham, severely wounded; Lieutenant W. S. Carter, slightly wounded; Lieutenant J. C. Bishop, severely wounded; Lieutenant R. E. De Montmorency, severe contusion; Lieutenant C. E. Young, severely wounded.

42d Native Light Infantry—Lieutenant J. Spence, killed. Ensign E. Van Holt slightly wounded.

Second Infantry Division.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—Major R. Codrington, Assistant Quartermaster-general, severely wounded.

Second Native Grenadiers—Captain T. W. Bolton, severely wounded. Captain J. Gifford, severely wounded; Ensign A. D. Warden, severe contusion.

Third Infantry Division.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—Major General Sir J. M'Caskill, K.C.B. and K.H., killed.

Fifth Brigade.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—Ensign J. Hanham, slightly wounded.

Sixth Brigade.

Her Majesty's 80th Foot—Lieutenant-Colonel T. Bunbury, slightly wounded.

P Grant,

Major, Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

RETURN of ORDNANCE captured from the Sikh Army, at the battle of *Moodkee*, on the 18th of December 1845, by the Army of the *Sutlege*, under the command of His Excellency Sir HUGH GOUGH, G.C.B. Commander-in-Chief.

6 Brass guns	-	-	-	4 in. 6-tenths	-	-	-	12	pounders.
1 Brass howitzer	-	-	-	6 in. 5-tenths	-	-	-	6½	pounders.
4 Brass guns	-	-	-	4 in. 2-tenths	-	-	-	9	pounders.
3 Brass guns	-	-	-	3 in. 6-tenths	-	-	-	6	pounders,
1 Brass gun	-	-	-	2 in. 9-tenths	-	-	-	3	pounder.

REMARKS.

Total number of guns captured 15. It was impossible to compute the quantity of metal in these guns, but it was evident that they were much heavier than those of a similar calibre in the Bengal artillery.

The carriages were all in good repair, with the exception of one or two struck by our shot. The whole were destroyed, and the guns left in the fort of Moodkee.

Four more guns reported to have been dismounted by the men of the horse artillery, and left on the field from want of means to bring them away.

(signed) *Geo. Brooke,*Brigadier, Commanding Artillery, Army of the *Sutlej*.

Enclosure No. 4, in No. 11.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF to the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Camp, Ferozeshah, December 22d, 1845.

Right Honourable Sir,

I HAVE again to congratulate you on the success of our arms. A grand battle has been fought against the Sikh army at this place, and, by the blessing of Divine Providence, victory has been won, by the valour of our troops, against odds, and under circumstances which will render this action one of the most memorable in the page of Indian history.

After the combat of the 18th, at Moodkee, information was received the following day that the enemy, in increased numbers, were moving on to attack us. A line of defence was taken up in advance of our encampment, and dispositions made to repel assault, but the day wore away without their appearing, and at night we had the satisfaction of being reinforced by Her Majesty's 29th foot, and the East India Company's 1st European light infantry, with our small division of heavy guns.

I must here allude to a circumstance most favourable to our efforts in the field. On this evening, in addition to the valuable counsel with which you had in every emergency before favoured me, you were pleased yet further to strengthen my hands by kindly offering your services as second in command in my army. I need hardly say with how much pleasure the offer was accepted.

On the morning of the 21st the offensive was resumed; our columns of all arms debouched four miles on the road to Ferozeshah, where it was known that the enemy, posted in great force and with a most formidable artillery, had remained since the action of the 18th, incessantly employed in entrenching his position. Instead of advancing to the direct attack of their formidable works, our force manœuvred to their right: the second and fourth divisions of Infantry, in front, supported by the first division and Cavalry in second line, continued to defile for some time out of cannon shot between the Sikhs and Ferozepore. The desired effect was not long delayed, a cloud of dust was seen on our left, and, according to the instructions sent him on the preceding evening, Major-general Sir John Littler, with his division, availing himself of the offered opportunity, was discovered in full march to unite

unite his force with mine. The junction was soon effected, and thus was accomplished one of the great objects of all our harassing marches and privations, in the relief of this division of our army from the blockade of the numerous forces by which it was surrounded.

Dispositions were now made for an united attack on the enemy's entrenched camp. We found it to be a parallelogram, of about a mile in length and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah; the shorter sides looking towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Ferozepore and the open country. We moved against the last-named face, the ground in front of which was like the Sikh position in Moodkee, covered with low jungle.

The divisions of Major-general Sir John Littler, Brigadier Wallace (who had succeeded Major-general Sir John M'Caskill), and Major-general Gilbert, deployed into line, having in the centre our whole force of artillery, with the exception of three troops of horse artillery, one on either flank and one in support, to be moved as occasion required. Major-general Sir Harry Smith's division, and our small cavalry force, moved in second line, having a brigade in reserve to cover each wing.

I should here observe, that I committed the charge and direction of the left wing to Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge, while I personally conducted the right.

A very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position upwards of 100 guns, more than 40 of which were of battering calibre. These kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced and carried these formidable entrenchments: they threw themselves upon the guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy; but, when the batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiery had to face such a fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that, in spite of the most heroic efforts, a portion only of the entrenchment could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was every where raging.

Although I now brought up Major-general Sir Harry Smith's division, and he captured and long retained another point of the position, and Her Majesty's 3d light dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouacked upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In this state of things the long night wore away.

Near the middle of it, one of their heavy guns was advanced, and played with deadly effect upon our troops. Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge immediately formed Her Majesty's 80th foot and the 1st European light infantry. They were led to the attack by their commanding officers, and animated in their exertions by Lieutenant-colonel Wood (aide-de-camp to the Lieutenant-general), who was wounded in the outset, the 80th captured the gun, and the enemy, dismayed by this counter-check, did not venture to press on further. During the whole night, however, they continued to harass our troops by fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered our position.

But, with day-light of the 22d, came retribution. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse artillery, whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played with great effect upon this point, dismounting our pieces, and blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing.

Our line advanced, and, unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then, changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manoeuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along its front, with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of 73 pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field.

The force assumed a position on the ground which it had won, but even here its labours were not to cease; in the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Sing, who had commanded in the great last battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozepore fresh battalions and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorepurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position at Ferozeshah; this attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become manifest, when the Sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank; and, when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village as compelled us to change our whole front to the right; his guns during this manœuvre maintained an incessant fire, whilst our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats, we were unable to answer him with a single shot.

I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire, and to abandon the field.

For twenty-four hours not a Sikh has appeared in our front. The remains of the Khalsa army are said to be in full retreat across the Sutlej, at Nuggurpauthur and Tilla, or marching up its left bank towards Hurreekeeputhur, in the greatest confusion and dismay. Of their chiefs, Bahadur Sing is killed; Lal Sing is said to be wounded; Mehtab Sing, Adjoodhia Pershad, and Tej Sing, the late governor of Peshawar, have fled with precipitation. Their camp is the scene of the most awful carnage, and they have abandoned large stores of grain, camp equipage, and ammunition.

Thus has apparently terminated this unprovoked and criminal invasion of the peaceful provinces under British protection.

On the conclusion of such a narrative as I have given, it is surely superfluous in me to say, that I am, and shall be to the last moment of my existence, proud of the army which I had the honour to command on the 21st and 22d instant; to their gallant exertions I owe the satisfaction of seeing such a victory achieved, and the glory of having my own name associated with it.

The loss of this army has been heavy; how could a hope be formed that it should be otherwise; within thirty hours this force stormed an entrenched camp, fought a general action, and sustained two considerable combats with the enemy; within four days it has dislodged from their positions, on the left bank of the Sutlej, 60,000 Sikh soldiers, supported by upwards of 150 pieces of cannon, 108 of which the enemy acknowledge to have lost, and 91 of which are in our possession.

In addition to our losses in the battle, the captured camp was found to be everywhere protected by charged mines, by the successive springing of which many brave officers and men have been destroyed.

I must bear testimony to the valour displayed in these actions by the whole of the regiments of Her Majesty's service employed, and the East India Company's 1st European light infantry; the native force seconded in a most spirited manner their gallant conduct.

To Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, my second in command, my warmest thanks are due, not only for his personal exertions, which were conspicuous to all, but for the able assistance he afforded me through all the eventful scenes of this well-fought action. To the general and my personal staff I feel deeply indebted for their unceasing exertions. Majors-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert and Sir John Littler and Brigadier Wallace (who nobly fell in the hour of victory), fully realized the high expectations I had formed of their conduct as leaders of divisions.

With the brigadiers, the commandant of artillery, and the chief engineer, the commanding officers of regiments, and with the departmental staff, I was also greatly pleased; their exertions were most unremitting, and highly praiseworthy.

The reports I have received from the Generals of divisions of Infantry, the Brigadiers of Cavalry, and the Commandant of Artillery, speak in the highest terms of their respective staff; and it is my intention, as soon as possible, to forward to you, Right Honourable Sir, a list containing the names of all the officers I have just enumerated, together with the names of all those who appear to me specially to merit approbation and favour.

The hurried manner in which I am forced to collect information, and prepare these numerous details, may, I fear, cause the omission of the names of some officers.

officers well deserving of notice; but I shall not fail to send in a supplementary list when I can assure myself of their individual merits, as it would be most painful to me to feel that I had not done justice to any one of the brave men who shared with me the glories and dangers of this arduous conflict.

I beg now to mention the conduct of an illustrious nobleman, Count Ravensburg, who, with the officers of his suite, Counts Greuben and Oriola, did us the honour to accompany the force during our operations. They were present at Moodkee, and in this great battle. It is with the greatest pleasure and sincerity I can bear my testimony to their gallant conduct on these occasions, worthy of the high reputation in arms of their countrymen, and of the great ancestor of one of them. I lament to add, that Dr. Hoffmeister, the medical attendant on the count, was killed in the action of the 21st instant.

I herewith inclose the report of Lieutenant-general the Right honourable Sir H. Hardinge, second in command.

I have, &c.

(signed) *H. Gough,*

General, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

RETURN of KILLED and WOUNDED of the Army of the *Sutlej*, under the Command of His Excellency General Sir *Hugh Gough*, Bart., G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief, in the Actions fought near Ferozeshah, on the 21st and 22d of December 1845.

Camp, Sultan Khan Wallah,
27 December 1845.

Personal Staff—2 European officers wounded.

General Staff—1 European officer killed; 1 ditto wounded.

TOTAL—1 European officer killed; 3 European officers wounded.

ARTILLERY DIVISION.

1st Brigade of Horse Artillery—1 European officer, 7 rank and file, 3 lascars, 35 regimental horses, killed; 4 sergeants, 28 rank and file, 3 lascars, 1 syce, 37 regimental horses, wounded.

3d Brigade of Horse Artillery—1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 14 rank and file, 2 syces, 70 regimental horses, killed; 1 European officer, 3 sergeants, 18 rank and file, 3 lascars, 1 syce, 18 regimental horses, wounded.

3d Company 4th Battalion, Foot Artillery, with No. 7 Light Field Battery—2 rank and file, 2 regimental horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 rank and file, 1 syce, 16 regimental horses, wounded.

2d Company 6th Battalion, with No. 9 Light Field Battery—1 rank and file, 1 lascar, 10 regimental horses, killed; 1 serjeant, 3 regimental horses, wounded.

4th Company 6th Battalion, with No. 19 Light Field Battery—1 rank and file, 1 lascar, 2 syces, killed; 1 lascar, wounded.

2d Company 7th Battalion, No. 6 Light Field Battery—2 native officers, 1 rank and file, 1 syce, 1 regimental horse, killed; 1 rank and file, 1 syce, 1 regimental horse, wounded.

2d and 4th Companies 4th Battalion, with Siege Guns—2 warrant officers, 2 sergeants, 13 rank and file, wounded.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—2 European officers wounded.

TOTAL—2 European officers, 2 native officers, 1 serjeant, 26 rank and file, 4 lascars, 4 syces, 2 syces and grass-cutters, 118 regimental horses, killed; 4 European officers, 2 warrant officers, 10 sergeants, 61 rank and file, 7 lascars, 2 syce drivers, 2 syces or grass-cutters, 75 horses, wounded.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—3 European officers wounded.

First Brigade.

Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons—3 European officers, 2 sergeants, 1 trumpeter, 54 rank and file, 8 officers' chargers, killed; 6 European officers, 6 sergeants, 80 rank and file, 60 regimental horses, wounded.

8th Regiment of Light Cavalry—1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, 20 regimental horses, killed; 1 warrant officer, 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, 12 regimental horses, wounded.

9th Regiment Irregular Cavalry—2 native officers, 8 rank and file, 36 regimental horses, killed; 11 rank and file, 15 regimental horses, wounded.

Second Brigade.

Governor General's Body Guard—10 regimental horses, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded
5th Regiment of Light Cavalry—1 havildar, 8 regimental horses, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded.

8th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, 11 regimental horses, killed; 4 rank and file, 5 regimental horses, wounded.

Third Brigade.

4th Regiment Light Cavalry, Lancers—9 rank and file, 61 regimental horses, killed; 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 6 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, wounded.

3d Regiment Irregular Cavalry—3 rank and file, 17 regimental horses, killed; 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 13 rank and file, 20 regimental horses, wounded.

TOTAL—3 European officers, 2 native officers, 4 sergeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 78 rank and file, 9 officers' chargers, 163 regimental horses, killed; 9 European officers, 2 native officers, 1 warrant officer, 9 sergeants or havildars, 133 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, 112 regimental horses, wounded.

1st INFANTRY DIVISION.

1st Brigade.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—2 European officers, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 36 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, killed; 6 European officers, 4 sergeants, 92 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, wounded.

24th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 3 native officers, 4 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 2 havildars, 24 rank and file, wounded.

47th Regiment Native Infantry—9 rank and file killed; 2 havildars, 1 drummer, 23 rank and file, wounded.

2d Brigade.

Her Majesty's 50th Foot—27 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, killed; 6 European officers, 5 sergeants, 3 drummers, 83 rank and file, wounded.

42d Regiment Native Light Infantry—1 European officer, 2 native officers, 2 havildars, 10 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 5 havildars, 4 drummers, 31 rank and file, wounded.

48th Native Infantry—1 native officer, 1 havildar, 13 rank and file, 3 officers' chargers, killed; 2 European officers, 3 havildars, 46 rank and file, wounded.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—3 officers' chargers killed; 3 European officers, 1 officer's charger, wounded.

TOTAL—4 European officers, 6 native officers, 5 sergeants or havildars, 1 drummer, 119 rank and file, 9 officers' chargers, killed; 19 European officers, 21 sergeants or havildars, 8 drummers, 299 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, wounded.

SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—2 European officers, 3 officers' chargers, killed; 1 European officer, 1 officer's charger, wounded.

Third Brigade.

Her Majesty's 29th Foot—2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 67 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, killed; 2 European officers, 6 sergeants, 4 drummers, 106 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, wounded.

45th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 native officers, 14 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 30 rank and file, wounded.

Fourth Brigade.

1st European Light Infantry—2 European officers, 2 sergeants, 43 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, killed; 6 European officers, 12 sergeants, 4 drummers, 135 rank and file, wounded.

2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers)—1 European officer, 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 15 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 3 native officers, 2 havildars, 43 rank and file, wounded.

16th Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers)—1 European officer, 2 havildars, 11 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 5 native officers, 5 havildars, 51 rank and file, wounded.

TOTAL—8 European officers, 3 native officers, 6 sergeants or havildars, 150 rank and file, 6 officers' chargers, killed; 18 European officers, 9 native officers, 26 sergeants or havildars, 8 drummers, 365 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, wounded.

THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—1 European officer killed.

Fifth Brigade.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 66 rank and file, killed; 6 European officers, 5 sergeants, 1 drummer, 191 rank and file, wounded.

26th Regiment Native Infantry—2 European officers, 1 havildar, 1 drummer, 7 rank and file, killed; 1 native officer, 2 havildars, 42 rank and file, wounded.

73d Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 1 native officer, 19 rank and file, killed; 1 native officer, 5 havildars, 30 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

Sixth Brigade.

Her Majesty's 80th foot—4 European officers, 1 drummer, 19 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, killed; 3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 1 drummer, 52 rank and file, wounded.

TOTAL—

TOTAL—11 European officers, 1 native officer, 2 sergeants or havildars, 2 drummers, 111 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, killed; 9 European officers, 2 native officers, 13 sergeants or havildars, 2 drummers, 315 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—1 European officer, 5 officers' chargers, killed; 2 native officers wounded.

7th Brigade.

Her Majesty's 62d Foot—7 European officers, 6 sergeants, 76 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, killed; 10 European officers, 5 sergeants, 2 drummers, 154 rank and file, wounded.

12th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 native officer, 10 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 5 havildars, 2 drummers, 59 rank and file, wounded.

14th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 native officer, 2 havildars, 12 rank and file, 1 officer's charger, killed; 5 European officers, 1 native officer, 4 havildars, 59 rank and file, wounded.

8th Brigade.

33d Regiment of Native Infantry—1 native officer, 1 havildar, 6 rank and file, killed; 3 native officers, 5 havildars, 1 drummer, 31 rank and file, wounded.

44th Regiment of Native Infantry—9 rank and file killed; 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 14 rank and file, wounded.

54th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 rank and file killed; 6 rank and file wounded.

TOTAL—8 European officers, 3 native officers, 9 sergeants or havildars, 115 rank and file, 7 officers' chargers, killed; 21 European officers, 5 native officers, 20 sergeants or havildars, 5 drummers, 323 rank and file, wounded.

ABSTRACT.

Staff—1 European officer, killed; 3 European officers, wounded.

Artillery Division—2 European officers, 2 native officers, 1 serjeant, 26 rank and file, 4 lascars, 4 syce drivers, 2 syce grass-cutters, 118 regimental horses, killed; 4 European officers, 2 warrant officers, 10 sergeants, 61 rank and file, 7 lascars, 2 syce drivers, 2 syce grass-cutters, 75 regimental horses, wounded.

Cavalry—3 European officers, 2 native officers, 4 havildars, 1 trumpeter, 78 rank and file, 9 officers' chargers, 163 regimental officers, killed; 9 European officers, 2 native officers, 1 warrant officer, 9 havildars, 133 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, 112 regimental horses, wounded.

1st Infantry—4 European officers, 6 native officers, 5 sergeants or havildars, 1 drummer, 119 rank and file, 9 officers' chargers, killed; 19 European officers, 21 sergeants or havildars, 8 drummers, 299 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, wounded.

2d Infantry—8 European officers, 3 native officers, 6 sergeants or havildars, 150 rank and file, 6 officers' chargers, killed; 13 European officers, 9 native officers, 26 sergeants or havildars, 8 drummers, 365 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, wounded.

3d Infantry—11 European officers, 1 native officer, 2 sergeants or havildars, 2 drummers, 111 rank and file, 2 officers' chargers, killed; 9 European officers, 2 native officers, 13 sergeants or havildars, 2 drummers, 315 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

4th Infantry—8 European officers, 3 native officers, 9 sergeants or havildars, 115 rank and file, 7 officers' chargers, killed; 21 European officers, 5 native officers, 20 sergeants or havildars, 5 drummers, 323 rank and file, wounded.

Grand Total—37 European officers, 17 native officers, 27 sergeants or havildars, 4 trumpeters or drummers, 599 rank and file, 4 lascars, 4 syce drivers, 2 syce grass-cutters, 33 officers' chargers, 281 regimental horses, killed; 78 European officers, 18 native officers, 3 warrant officers, 99 sergeants or havildars, 23 trumpeters or drummers, 1,496 rank and file, 8 lascars, 2 syce drivers, 2 syce grass-cutters, 6 officers' chargers, 187 regimental horses, wounded.

NAMES OF OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

Personal Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Wood, Aide-de-Camp to the Right honourable the Governor-general, severely wounded; Lieutenant F. P. Haines, Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, severely ditto.

General Staff—Major A. W. Fitzroy Somerset, Military Secretary to the Right hon. the Governor-general, mortally ditto, since dead; Brevet Captain W. Hore, Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government, killed.

Artillery Division, Divisional Staff—Captain W. K. Warner, Commissary of Ordnance, slightly wounded.

Brigade Staff—Captain M. Mackenzie, Major of Brigade, slightly wounded.

2d Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery—Captain E. D. A. Todd, killed.

1st Troop, 3d Brigade, Horse Artillery—1st Lieutenant R. M. Paton, slightly wounded.

3d Troop, 3d Brigade, Horse Artillery—1st Lieutenant P. C. Lambert, killed.

3d Company, 4th Battalion.—1st Lieutenant E. Atlay, slightly wounded.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Divisional Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel D. Harriott, Commandant, slightly wounded, Captain C. F. Havelock, Her Majesty's 9th Foot, D. A. Quartermaster-general, wounded.

Brigade Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel M. White, C. B., Commanding 1st Brigade, slightly wounded.

Her Majesty's 3d Light Dragoons—Brevet Captain J. E. Codd, killed; Cornet H. Ellis, ditto; Cornet G. W. K. Bruce, Her Majesty's 16th ditto.

Ditto—Major C. W. M. Balders, slightly wounded; Lieutenant H. C. Morgan, severely wounded; Lieutenant J. G. A. Burton, slightly wounded; Cornet W. H. Orme, severely wounded; Cornet Lieutenant J. D. White, slightly wounded; Cornet J. Rathwell, ditto.

1ST DIVISION OF INFANTRY.

Divisional Staff—Captain E. Lugard, D. A. A. G., wounded; Lieutenant A. J. Galloway, D. A. Q. M. G., ditto; Lieutenant E. A. Holdich, A. D. C., ditto.

Her Majesty's 31st Foot—Lieutenant J. L. R. Pollard, killed; Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Bernard, ditto.

Ditto—Major G. Baldwin, severely wounded; Lieutenant T. H. Plaskett, severely wounded; Lieutenant A. Pilkington, ditto; Ensign J. Paul, slightly wounded; Ensign H. P. Hutton, ditto.

Her Majesty's 50th Foot—Captain W. Knowles, wounded; Lieutenant C. A. Mouat, ditto; Lieutenant E. J. Chambers, ditto; Lieutenant R. M. Barnes, ditto; Ensign A. White, ditto; Lieutenant and Adjutant E. C. Mullen, ditto.

24th Regiment, Native Infantry—Brevet Major J. Griffin, killed.

Ditto, Ensign E. A. Grubb, wounded.

42d Light Infantry—Lieutenant J. G. Wollen, killed.

Ditto, Lieutenant Adjutant C. W. Ford, wounded; Ensign J. Wardlaw, ditto.

48th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant E. W. Litchford, slightly wounded; R. C. Taylor, ditto.

2D DIVISION OF INFANTRY.

Brigade Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Taylor, Brigadier, wounded.

Captain J. O. Lucas, Major of Brigade, killed; Captain J. H. Burnett, 16th Native Infantry, ditto.

Her Majesty's 29th Foot—Captain G. Molle, killed; Lieutenant A. A. Simmons, ditto.

Ditto, Major G. Congreve, wounded; Captain A. St. G. H. Stepney, ditto.

1st European Light Infantry—Captain T. Box, killed; Ensign P. Moxon, ditto.

Ditto—Captain C. Clark, severely wounded; Captain B. Kendall, dangerously ditto; Lieutenant D. C. T. Beatson, 14th Native Infantry, officiating interpreter, severely ditto; Lieutenant R. W. H. Fanshawe, slightly ditto; Ensign F. O. Salusbury, severely ditto; Ensign C. R. Wriford, slightly ditto.

2d Regiment Native Infantry, Grenadiers—Ensign G. A. Armstrong, killed.

Ditto—Captain T. W. Bolton, severely wounded; Ensign W. S. R. Hodson, slightly ditto.

16th Regiment Native Infantry, Grenadiers—Major L. N. Hull, killed.

Ditto—Ensign J. J. O'Brien, slightly wounded.

45th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant C. V. Hamilton, wounded.

3D DIVISION OF INFANTRY.

Brigade Staff—Lieutenant-colonel N. Wallace, Brigadier, killed.

Her Majesty's 9th Foot—Lieutenant-colonel A. B. Taylor, killed; Captain J. Dunne, ditto; Captain J. F. Field, ditto.

Ditto—Captain A. Borton, severely wounded; Lieutenant A. Taylor, severely wounded; Lieutenant J. U. Vigors, slightly wounded; Lieutenant F. Sievwright, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant W. G. Cassidy, dangerously wounded; Ensign W. H. Forster, contused.

Her Majesty's 80th Foot—Captain A. D. W. Best, killed; Captain R. Scheberras, ditto; Lieutenant R. B. Warren, ditto; Lieutenant G. C. G. Bythesen, ditto.

Ditto—Major R. A. Lockhart, wounded; Brevet Captain S. Fraser, since dead; Lieutenant M. D. Freeman, wounded.

26th Light Infantry, Native Infantry—Lieutenant G. A. Croly, killed; Lieutenant A. C. Eatwell, ditto.

73d Regiment Native Infantry—Captain R. M. Hunter, killed.

4TH DIVISION OF INFANTRY.

Divisional Staff—Lieutenant Harvey, Aide-de-camp, killed; Captain J. F. Egerton, D. A. Q. M. G., wounded.

Brigade Staff—Captain C. F. J. Burnett, Major of Brigade, slightly wounded; Lieutenant-colonel T. Reed, slightly ditto.

Her Majesty's 62d Foot—Captain G. H. Clarke, killed; Captain H. Wells, ditto; Lieutenant T. K. Scott, ditto; Lieutenant W. M'Nair, ditto; Lieutenant R. Gubbins, ditto; Lieutenant M. Kelly, ditto; Lieutenant and Adjutant G. Sims, ditto.

Ditto—Major W. T. Shortt, slightly wounded; Captain S. W. Graves, badly ditto; Captain C. W. Sibley, ditto; Captain D. G. A. Darroch, slightly ditto; Lieutenant M. J. Gregorson, badly ditto; Lieutenant W. L. Ingall, slightly ditto; Lieutenant A. S. Craig, severely ditto; Ensign C. Roberts, ditto; Ensign J. M. M. Hewett, slightly ditto.

12th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant-colonel L. Bruce, very severely wounded; Captain W. B. Holmes, severely ditto; Lieutenant C. B. Tulloch, very severely ditto; Ensign J. H. C. Ewart, slightly ditto.

14th Regiment Native Infantry—Captain W. Struthers, slightly wounded; Bt. Captain C. G. Walsh, ditto; Lieutenant A. O. Wood, severely ditto; Lieutenant I. H. H. Lukin, slightly ditto; Ensign G. Weld, severely ditto.

P. Grant,

Major, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

KILLED.

European officers, 37.
Native ditto, 17.
Non-commissioned, drummers, rank and file, 630.
Syces, drivers, &c., 10.
TOTAL, 694.

WOUNDED.

European officers, 78.
Native ditto, 18.
Non-commissioned, drummers, rank and file, 1,610.
Syces, drivers, &c., 12.
Warrant officers, 3.
TOTAL, 1,721.

GRAND TOTAL of all ranks, killed and wounded - - - - 2,415.

RETURN of ORDNANCE captured during the Action of the 21st and 22d instant.

				Camp, Fer ozeshah, 27 Decem ber 1845.			
				No.			
Gun	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
Howitzer	-	-	42-pounder	-	-	-	1
Gun	-	-	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	8-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	8-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	8-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	8-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	6-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	12-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	-	7-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	brass	7-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	18-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	11-pounder	-	-	-	1
Howitzer	-	ditto	24-pounder	-	-	-	1
Gun	-	ditto	3-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	iron	3-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	brass	24-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder	-	-	-	1
ditto	-	ditto	3-pounder	-	-	-	1
				Gun	-	brass	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	12-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	10-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	12-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	10-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	10-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	12-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	3-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	10-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	3-pounder
				Mortar	-	ditto	10-inch shell
				Gun	-	ditto	3-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	6-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	7-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	3-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	8-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	32-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	9-pounder
				Mortar	-	ditto	24-pounder
				Gun	-	ditto	9-pounder
				Howitzer	-	ditto	9-pounder
				Gun	-	ditto	18-pounder
				ditto	-	ditto	-

Many of these guns have long Persian inscriptions on them, and very old dates; some are highly ornamented; carriages in good repair, and closely assimilating to those in use with the Bengal Artillery; the whole well fitted for post guns; the metal in these guns is much heavier than those of a similar calibre in use with the Bengal Artillery.

Two more guns were discovered at Sooltan-Khan Wallah, of which no return has yet been received.

W. K. Warner,
Lieutenant and Brevet Captain, Commissary of Ordnance.

M. McKenzie,
Brevet Captain, Brigade-Major Artillery, Army of the Sutlej.

Geo. G. Denniss,
Brigadier of Foot Artillery, Army of the Sutlej.

George Brooke,
Brigadier Commanding Artillery, Army of the Sutlej.

Enclosure No. 5 in No. 11.

Lieutenant-general Sir *Henry Hardinge*, G. C. B., to General Sir *Hugh Gough*,
Bart., G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief in India.

Sir,

Camp, Ferozepore, 22 December 1845.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, when the army under your command had formed its junction with the forces from Ferozepore, under Major-general Sir John Littler, and was drawn up in order of battle, on the 21st instant, I proceeded with the two left brigades, commanded by Colonels Wallace and M'Laren, to attack the enemy's entrenched position at Ferozesah.

2. The line advanced with great steadiness, notwithstanding the nature of the ground, intersected with jungle. When the troops had cleared these impediments, and had opened out into the plain, they continued to press on, without a check, under a very heavy fire of grape and musketry from the enemy's batteries, and having borne down all opposition, entered the enemy's camp, and captured the guns in their front.

3. This portion of the camp was soon after on fire, compelling the troops to desist from their attack of the remainder; and as it was now dark, the troops formed on the ground, nearly on a line with the burning camp. From that period till the morning, these brave men were exposed to an incessant fire from the enemy's guns, the darkness of the night being illuminated by the explosion of mines, tumbrils and shells.

4. I need not dwell on the events of this night, so remarkable in military history, because your Excellency witnessed them, and with me admired the fortitude and resolution of these brave men, ready to encounter any danger, although harassed by fatigue and suffering from thirst.

5. I have personally reported to your Excellency my admiration of the conduct of Her Majesty's 80th regiment, and the 1st European Light Infantry, in obeying with alacrity the order I gave about midnight to stand to their arms and charge a battery, which bore destructively on our ranks. Lieutenant-colonel Bunbury, assisted by Lieutenant-colonel Wood, my Aide-de-camp, led the attack, on which occasion the latter officer was wounded. The guns were spiked, the enemy driven away with loss, and this part of our line left undisturbed for the remainder of the night. Their conduct in the preceding part of the action came more immediately under your Excellency's own observation.

6. Your Excellency, having formed the troops before daylight, led the right of the attack, intrusting the left to me. The whole line instantly advanced, and, animated by your example, carried every thing before them; and, having traversed the camp from one extremity to the other, drew up in a perfect line, expressing by loud cheers, as we rode up the line, their conscious pride that every man had done his duty.

7. I again most cordially congratulate you on the brilliant success of the army under your Excellency's command.

8. It is now my duty to report to your Excellency, that Major-general Gilbert, commanding a portion of this division of the army, gave me the greatest satisfaction.

9. Colonel Wallace fell bravely at the head of his troops.

10. Colonel M'Laren led his brigade with his accustomed judgment and resolution.

11. My own personal Staff having been all disabled, with the exception of one most dear to me, and who still remained by my side, I derived, on the morning of the 22d, the most valuable aid from Lieutenant-colonel Birch, Judge-Advocate-General; from Lieutenant-colonel Parsons; and from your Excellency's intelligent and brave Aide-de-camp, Captain West. These officers, riding several paces in front of the line, regulated the advance, animated the men, and prevented any unnecessary firing.

12. I have great obligations, during the whole of these operations, to Colonel Benson, a member of the Military Board, and acting as my Aide-de-camp, who has constantly accompanied me in the field, and in whose cool judgment and experienced ability I place great reliance.

13. My Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-colonel Wood, has shown all the qualities which make a good officer.

14. I beg to bring to your notice my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Hillier, who is wounded, and Lieutenant Peel, of the 37th Native Infantry, Acting Aide-de-camp,

camp, who is slightly wounded. Captain Becher, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, attached to my camp, also accompanied me, and I recommend him as a very promising officer.

15. I also recommend the Officers belonging to the Political Agency of these provinces, who acted as my Aides-de-camp, Captain Abbott, and Lieutenant Lake, and are both wounded. Captain Mills, Acting Aide-de-camp, took the command of a troop of Horse Artillery with his usual spirit.

16. It is now with great pain that I have to record the irreparable loss I have sustained, and more especially the East India Company's Service, in the death of Major Broadfoot, of the Madras Army, my Political Agent. He was thrown from his horse by a shot, and I failed in prevailing upon him to leave the field. He re-mounted, and shortly afterwards received a mortal wound. He was as brave as he was able in every branch of the Political and Military Service.

17. Major Somerset, my Military Secretary, much about the same time, was shot through the body, conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race. He was always foremost where difficulties required to be overcome. I deeply regret his loss.

18. I have also lost a most promising and brave officer by the death of Captain Herries, on the night of the 18th, at Moodkee.

19. Lieutenant Munro, of the 10th Light Cavalry, my Aide-de-camp, a most amiable and excellent officer, I have also had the misfortune to lose, whilst placed at your Excellency's disposal, in the affair at Moodkee.

20. Captain Hore, Assistant Military Secretary, and a valuable officer, acting as my Aide-de-camp, was killed about the same time as Major Somerset received his wound.

21. I have now to request your Excellency's notice to the conduct of an illustrious nobleman, Count Ravensburg, who, with the officers of his suite, Count Greuben and Count Oriola, accompanied me in the field. These Prussian officers nobly sustained the reputation of their countrymen.

22. The Prince's surgeon was struck to the ground by a ball. I saw his Royal Highness instantly spring from his horse to his assistance. The Prince's humanity was unavailing; death had already closed the surgeon's career.

23. I am aware of the respectful regard which your Excellency entertains for this illustrious nobleman and his companions, travellers in the East; and I know that this brief record of their actions will be gratifying to your Excellency.

I have, &c.

H. Hardinge.

Enclosure No. 6 in No. 11.

Major-general Sir *John Littler* to the Adjutant-general of the Army.

Sir,

Ferozepore, 25 December 1845.

In pursuance of instructions received from the Right honourable the Governor-general, under date the 20th instant, I moved out of my position at Ferozepore at 8 A.M. on the 21st instant, with the corps as per margin,* leaving the defence of the cantonments to the 63d Regiment Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Wilkinson, and that of the town to the 27th Regiment Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Carnegie, together with detachments of Sappers, and half a field battery in the town, and 2d company (reserve) of Artillery in the entrenchment.

* 2 Troops Horse Artillery.	
1½ Light Field Battery.	
8th Light Cavalry.	
3d Irregular Cavalry.	
H. M. 62d Foot,	
12th Native Infantry,	1st Brigade.
14th ditto -	
33d ditto -	
44th ditto -	2d Brigade.
54th ditto -	
Detachment of Sappers.	

I effected a junction with the troops under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and, agreeably to his instructions, moved into position, or order of battle, on the same evening about 4 P.M. The first advance in line was very steady, and the approach to the enemy's works made under a most galling and destructive fire. The casualties in the ranks were awful. The troops, however, still moved on with great firmness and resolution, and approached the enemy's battery to within about 150 yards, when I considered the prize to be within their grasp.

Brigadier T. Reed gave the order to charge, supported by the left or Brigadier the Honourable T. Ashburnham's Brigade. This charge was commenced with such determined gallantry and spirit, that the result seemed certain. The enemy, however, having great confidence in their guns, continued to serve them with extraordinary activity, and to make such havoc in our ranks, as to cause an immediate panic and hesitation in Her Majesty's 62d Foot, which of course had a similar effect on the native regiments on the flanks, notwithstanding all our exertions to induce them to advance by cheering and encouraging them, pointing at the same time to the short distance which they had to proceed when the day would be their own. It was all in vain, and they retired out of gun-shot to where Her Majesty's 9th Foot and 26th Regiment Native Infantry were drawn up in reserve. A part of the 14th Regiment Native Infantry, with their colours, accompanied these two regiments, and entered the enemy's batteries.

At this period it was nearly dark, and, as I had heard that the divisions on the right had also been unable to obtain an entrance, I bivouacked for the night in the vicinity.

On the following morning I obtained information of the right division having been directed to renew the attack, and I moved to co-operate, as might be necessary. I then received orders to wait until further instructions, and was moved up to the town and directed to hold it. The result of this attack was most glorious to the British army, and I heartily congratulate his Excellency and the Governor-general on the happy termination of probably one of the most sanguinary engagements that ever took place in India.

With the conduct of the troops in general, under me, I was much gratified; their patience and perseverance in marching through the day, exposed to the sun and want of water, must have, no doubt, in some measure weakened their energies, but they notwithstanding evinced great firmness and resolution in advancing to the attack, until borne down by the furious and irresistible fire from all arms, that men could be exposed to; the loss of many of their officers must have tended to relax their efforts and check their ardour, and under such circumstances only could the disappointment to Her Majesty's 62d regiment themselves and to their country have been for a moment conceived.

The native troops, under the numerous temptations to which they have been exposed for several months past by Sikh emissaries, have evinced their loyalty to the British Government in a most remarkable manner, not a single desertion having taken place, since the enemy crossed the Sutlej, that has come to my knowledge. They have maintained the character of the Bengal army in displaying courage and bravery under a heavy fire.

I have much pleasure in bringing to the favourable notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the services of those zealous and indefatigable officers, Brigadiers T. Reed, the Honourable T. Ashburnham, D. Harriott, commanding cavalry, and E. Huthwaite, commanding artillery, whose cool courage throughout the attack was conspicuous. To the several commanding officers of regiments and divisions, Lieutenant-colonel Gairdner, commanding 14th Regiment Native Infantry; Lieutenant-colonel Bruce, commanding 12th Regiment Native Infantry, who lost his arm in the action; Major Wake, commanding 44th Regiment Native Infantry; Major Shortt, commanding Her Majesty's 62d Foot; Major Osborn, commanding 54th Regiment Native Infantry; and Captain Sandeman, commanding 33d Regiment Native Infantry; I feel much indebted for the spirited and gallant manner in which they brought up their respective regiments during the advance.

It is with sincere regret that I have to report for his Excellency's information the death of my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Harvey, of Her Majesty's 39th Foot, a very promising and intelligent young officer, and devoted to his profession. He was shot during the advance, in the act of cheering on the men, when within about 250 yards of the enemy's works. His death will be a loss to the public service, and deplored by his friends and relations.

Of Captain Egerton, my Assistant Quartermaster-general, whose activity and zeal were conspicuous, I cannot speak too highly; he was severely wounded on the morning of the 22d.

It is with much gratification that I also submit for his Excellency's consideration, and acknowledge the obligation to Major P. Innes, my Deputy Assistant Adjutant-general, and Captain Burnett, Major of the Brigade, for their indefatigable exertions throughout the affair, as well as for their able assistance on all occasions.

Lieutenant Goodwyn, of the Engineers, has proved himself a most zealous and indefatigable officer during the whole time that the Sikh army has been opposite Ferozepore, as well as on the evening of the 21st, during the engagement, and whom I beg to recommend to his Excellency's notice.

To Captain W. B. Thomson, Commissariat Department, who accompanied me, and to Lieutenant W. Fullerton, superintending the Sudder Bazaar, who volunteered his services as my Aide-de-camp, and was particularly useful to me in the field, I feel indebted.

Captain Nicolson, late Assistant Governor-general's agent, and Colonel Van Courtland, late of the Sikh service, who were placed at my disposal by the late Major Broadfoot, c. b., afforded me every assistance in their power during the engagement and previously, when the Sikhs first crossed the Sutlej.

I have, &c.,

J. H. Littler,

Major-Gen. Commanding Inf. Division.

Enclosure No. 7 in No. 11.

NOTIFICATION.

Ferozepore, December 25th,
Christmas-day, 1845.

THE Governor-general has the heartfelt satisfaction to announce to his Honour the President in Council, to the army, and to the people of India, the repulse of the Sikh forces in their attack on a portion of the British army, near Moodkee, on the night of the 18th instant, and the capture, on the evening of the 21st and morning of the 22d, of their entrenched camp, with 70 pieces of cannon, defended by 60,000 men, near the village of Ferozeshah. Upwards of 90 pieces of the enemy's artillery have been taken in these two operations.

These events, so glorious to the British arms, have been followed by the precipitate retreat of the enemy towards the Sutlej, his pride abated, and the unprovoked aggression on the British territory signally avenged.

The Governor-general cordially congratulates the Commander-in-chief, General Sir Hugh Gough, Bart., c. b., on the entire success of his Excellency's rapid and energetic operations, in which the troops, both British and Native, have displayed, under circumstances of long-continued, fatigue, since the 11th instant, their accustomed discipline and valour.

The Governor-general will rejoice in recording the gallant exploits of the army during this important campaign, by decorating the breasts of the victors with a medal, as soon as the report of these operations shall be received from the Commander-in-chief.

Incessantly engaged in sharing with his brave troops their fatigues, and showing by his personal example at the head of his troops the value of enduring privations with patience, it has been impossible for his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, in the midst of so many occupations, to furnish to the Governor-general a detailed report of these brilliant successes.

The Governor-general, however, cannot refrain from notifying to the Honourable the President in Council, to the army, and to the people of India, these results so honourable to the British arms; and he directs that this notification be carefully made known to all the troops by being read on their parades, and communicated to all the departments of the Government, civil and military, and that a salute of 21 guns be fired from this fort of Ferozepore this day at one o'clock, and at every principal station of the army as soon as the notification shall be received.

These grateful and heartfelt acknowledgments to the army for its services cannot be closed without humbly remembering that our thanks are due to Him who is the only Giver of all victory, and without whose aid the battle is not to the strong.

The Governor-general, therefore, invites every British subject at this station to return thanks to Almighty God, this day at 11 o'clock, for the mercies He has so

recently vouchsafed us, by assembling at the Governor-general's tent, where prayers and thanksgivings will be read by the Governor-general's Chaplain.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

F. Currie,

Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-general.

Enclosure No. 8, in No. 11.

GENERAL ORDERS by the Right Honourable the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of India.

Camp, Ferozepore, December 30, 1845.

* December 19th
and 22d.

THE Governor-general having received from the Commander-in-Chief in India the despatches, dates of which are noted in the margin*, directs that they be published for the information of the army and people of India.

The first despatch from his Excellency reports the operations of the army on the evening of the 18th instant at Moodkee, where the enemy attempted to surprise the British camp, and were repulsed at all points, with the loss of 17 guns.

The second despatch reports the glorious successes obtained by the army under the immediate command of his Excellency, on the evening of the 21st and the morning of the 22d, at Ferozeshah, where the British army assaulted the entrenched camp of the Sikhs, defended by 108 pieces of cannon, some of heavy calibre, and after driving the enemy from his position, captured 74 guns. Thus the enemy have been forced to relinquish to their victors on these occasions upwards of 90 pieces of artillery, with all the munitions of war in their camp.

All the objects which the Governor-general desired to effect have been accomplished by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The British force posted at Ferozepore, thus suddenly and treacherously surrounded by the Sikh army, with a large park of artillery, has been relieved; the brave garrison, under its able commander Major-general Sir J. Littler, not only maintained a firm attitude of defence, but had the satisfaction, so grateful to brave soldiers, of skilfully forming a junction with the Umballa force, and gallantly taking part in the discomfiture of the enemy which had so recently invested them.

The Governor-general again cordially congratulates his Excellency General Sir Hugh Gough, G.C.B., on the great and important victories obtained by the army under his immediate command.

The Governor-general, in the name of the Government and of the people of India, gratefully acknowledges the noble services rendered to the public by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, by all the general and other officers, and by the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the brave Indian army.

The Governor-general's thanks are due to all the Infantry regiments of Her Majesty, and to the First European Light Infantry of the East India Company's Service, all of which regiments distinguished themselves by the most devoted courage in braving the destructive fire of the enemy's batteries and valiantly capturing their guns.

The Governor-general offers his thanks more especially to Her Majesty's 3d Dragoons, who, on all these occasions, sought opportunities of useful conflict with the enemy, and fought with that superiority over their opponents which skill and discipline impart to brave and determined men.

The European and Native Artillery maintained their accustomed character for steady, unyielding courage, when exposed to a very heavy and galling fire.

The Governor-general's thanks are justly due to the brave Infantry of the Native army, whose valour so mainly contributed to these victories, and he cannot withhold his admiration for the patience and perseverance with which they endured privations inseparable from forced marches.

The Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry, united together by the bonds of mutual esteem, may be confident that, when they rely on each other's courage, the three arms, combined and acting together, will ever be found to be an invincible army.

The Government of India, as a tribute of their esteem for the meritorious conduct of the troops engaged in the recent operations, will grant to every officer and

and soldier in the service of the Government of India, engaged in these battles, a medal to be worn with their uniforms, on which the word "Ferozeshah" shall be inscribed, as denoting that they have served in this important campaign.

The Commander-in-Chief will be so good as to furnish the Governor-general with lists of all the officers and soldiers engaged in the operations of this campaign.

The Governor-general is further pleased to order, that the following corps be permitted to wear the word "Ferozeshah" upon their appointments, standards and colours, in perpetual commemoration of their gallant services:—

- 1st and 3d Brigades Horse Artillery.
- 2d, 3d, and 4th Companies, 4th Battalion;
- 2d and 4th Companies, 6th Battalion;
- 2d Company, 7th Battalion, Foot Artillery.
- Governor-general's Body Guard.
- 4th, 5th, and 8th Regiments Light Cavalry.
- 3d, 8th, and 9th Regiments Irregular Cavalry.
- 1st European Light Infantry.
- 2d, 12th, 14th, 16th, 24th, 26th, 33d, 42d, 44th, 45th, 47th, 48th, 54th and 73d Regiments of Native Infantry.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

F. Currie.

Enclosure No. 9, in No. 11.

PROCLAMATION by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of *India*.

Ferozepore, December 31, 1845.

THE Lahore Government has, without provocation, or any declaration of hostilities, and notwithstanding the existence of a treaty of amity and alliance, made war upon the British Government. A large Sikh army has invaded the British territories, which has been repulsed and driven across the Sutlej, with the loss of 91 pieces of their artillery now in our possession. It becomes necessary, therefore, for the British Government to take measures for punishing this unprovoked aggression, and for preventing in future similar acts of treachery by the Government and army of the Punjab. The British Government considers it right now to call upon all natives and inhabitants of Hindoostan who have taken service under the Lahore Government, to quit that service, and place themselves under the orders of the Governor-general of India. As long as relations of amity existed between the two states, there was no objection to the natives of the one territory taking service with the Government of the other; but now that the Lahore state has become the avowed enemy of the Government of Hindoostan, it is incumbent on all natives of Hindoostan, whose homes and families are under British protection, to quit the service of the common enemy, and join that of the Government of their own country. All persons of the above description are, therefore, hereby called upon to repair to the British side of the Sutlej, and to report themselves to the British authorities; their interests will, in all cases, be respected; they will, if fit for the military service, be taken into that of the British Government, with all the advantages of pay and allowances enjoyed by British soldiers.

All natives of Hindoostan who, after the promulgation of this Proclamation, continue in the service of the enemy, will be considered to have forfeited all claim to British protection, and will be treated as traitors to their country, and enemies of the British Government.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India.

F. Currie,

Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-general.

INDIA.

P A P E R S
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THE LATE HOSTILITIES
ON THE
NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER
OF
INDIA.


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
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